![[Translate to English:] Luther Competition Forecast 2026](https://static.luther-lawfirm.com/fileadmin/user_upload/AdobeStock_1067447554.jpeg)
Once again, with the Luther Competition Forecast 2026, we take a look into the crystal ball to see which topics and trends in antitrust law are likely to become relevant in 2026.
The year 2025 has confirmed that companies are facing growing and complex economic and regulatory requirements. The variety of challenges in investment projects, mergers & acquisitions, market practices and contract negotiations is constantly increasing; it affects all sectors of the economy, from traditional industries such as energy, automotive, healthcare and food to the digital economy and new industries such as CO₂ storage. This growing complexity is accompanied by increasingly consistent enforcement of antitrust law at European and national level, which is illustrated by the strict and, in some cases, AI-supported prosecution of antitrust cases by national competition authorities and the European Commission in both horizontal and vertical antitrust cases, rigid enforcement of antitrust law in the digital economy across Europe and the discussion about expanding the powers of the Federal Cartel Office in the context of merger control (keyword: call-in powers), to name just a few aspects. At the same time, the dynamics of the further development of European and national investment control (FDI) mechanisms illustrate the interaction between national and European interests and various regulatory regimes.
In 2026, companies will still be well advised to seek antitrust advice at an early stage in order to meet the diverse challenges they face. However, we will continue to see not only the challenges but also the opportunities in every challenge in 2026.
In the following short articles, we would like to highlight a few selected topics and trends that we believe could become relevant in 2026 in the following areas.
The relatively small amount of fines imposed by the Federal Cartel Office for (horizontal) cartels of EUR 4 million does not reflect a decreasing determination of the Federal Cartel Office – on the contrary, several major cases are still pending, which are likely to lead to the imposition of fines in 2026. The European Commission (“Commission”), for its part, recently imposed fines totaling EUR 72 million on manufacturers of automotive starter batteries (cf. here). Several proceedings are also still pending at European level.
Considering the increased investigative activities of the Federal Cartel Office and the European Commission in the past year and the announcements made by the authorities, resolute prosecution of antitrust law infringements can also be expected for 2026.
In 2025 alone, the Federal Cartel Office conducted ten unannounced searches (‘dawn raids’) at several companies because of suspected antitrust law infringements. It is fair to predict that we may see a similar number of dawn raids in 2026. According to its own statements, the Federal Cartel Office is receiving increasing reports of alleged antitrust law infringements through a wide variety of channels, which often form the basis for further investigations, including dawn raids. The European Commission also remains active in this field, a trend that will most likely continue in 2026. For example, at the end of October, companies in the ski equipment sector were raided on suspicion of cartel agreements (cf. here). The judgements handed down in recent months, which have tended to facilitate obtaining search warrants (cf. here) and are likely to further encourage authorities in their investigative efforts. In this context, it will be interesting to see how the General Court of the European Union will decide on Red Bull’s action, in which the company seeks to have the European Commission (rather than Red Bull) bear the costs of a continued inspection (Case T-882/24, cf. here). Under this practice, the European Commission conducts the search of seized data not on site at the companies’ premises, but in Brussels. In January 2026, the General Court held an oral hearing, in which Red Bull emphasized its claim to have the costs for the transfer recovered.
With regard to the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, the European Commission and the Federal Cartel Office (without citing specific figures lately) have both emphasized that leniency applications remain a key tool for initially identifying possible antitrust law infringements. In 2026, the Federal Cartel Office will continue to intensify its screening of market data in order to identify anomalies that indicate anti-competitive behavior. According to its own statements, the Federal Cartel Office has been inspired by the Danish competition authority, which uses algorithms, among other things, to screen bidding behavior in public tenders for suspicious patterns. The fact that these measures, some of which are AI-supported, are actually successful is demonstrated not least by the European Commission's antitrust proceedings against Michelin, in which the initial suspicion was largely caused by AI-based examination of publicly available sources (such as earnings calls) (cf. here).
In view of the significant number of dawn raids, AI-supported market screenings and the consistent prosecution of anti-competitive behavior, preventive compliance will continue to gain importance for companies in 2026. Measures that can be taken proactively or should be taken (depending on the specific risk exposure) include the establishment of internal whistleblower systems (even below legal thresholds, if necessary), regular antitrust compliance trainings, preventive internal investigations and the systematic documentation of business processes that could potentially be relevant under antitrust law. Companies that take proactive measures in this area can not only reduce the risk of fines by avoiding violations, but also benefit from a reduction in fines in the event of an investigation. Hence, the role of comprehensive compliance monitoring is likely to continue to grow, especially in multinational corporations.
It can be assumed that one focus of public antitrust enforcement will remain on anti-competitive labor market practices. In recent years, an enforcement priority has particularly been wage-fixing (agreements between employers on wages and other remuneration) and no-poach agreements (agreements between employers on prohibiting the poaching of employees) (see Luther Competition Forecast 2025, Section I, cf. here). In 2026, a milestone in this regard will certainly be the judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Tondela case (Case C-133/24, cf. here), in which the highest European court will rule for the first time on ‘no-poach agreements’ – at the height of the Covid-pandemic, Portuguese football clubs agreed in the 2019-2020 season not to sign new contracts with each other’s football players. Will the European Court of Justice classify the clubs' behavior as justified in light of the pandemic?
In addition to AI-supported analyses by authorities, digital monitoring and the use of AI by companies themselves will also become more important in 2026. Digital monitoring tools, AI-supported analyses of business transactions and the systematic evaluation of market data can help to identify and document suspicious patterns at an early stage. The increasing digitization of investigative practices will thus both increase market transparency as well as the probability of detection and hence intensify the pressure on companies to implement proactive antitrust compliance.
Last but not least, the topic of artificial intelligence will continue to play a central role in antitrust enforcement in 2026. Artificial intelligence opens up new opportunities for competitors to exchange information in an anti-competitive manner or to coordinate prices with each other. At the same time, German politicians are endeavoring to create competition-oriented AI ecosystems (inter alia to increase digital sovereignty), as shown in particular by the expert commission on competition and artificial intelligence established in 2025 (cf. here). Its proposals (for example on the functionality of competition as such or on creating an effective and high-performing IT-infrastructure) are expected in 2026.
It does not take ‘rocket science’ to realize that ‘verticals’ will remain highly relevant in 2026. Vertical competition law infringements are and will be enforced in the same way as horizontal cartel agreements. This blogpost highlights a few cases which had been relevant in 2025 and takes a look ahead at the challenges that could be relevant in 2026.
In May 2025, the European Court of Justice further clarified the antitrust requirements for exclusive distribution agreements in a landmark ruling in the "Beemster Kaas" case (Case C-581/23, available here): The European Court of Justice confirmed that an exclusive distribution agreement requires that all (!) buyers excluded from an exclusive territory must agree – expressly or at least tacitly – not to make any active sales into the territory exclusively allocated by the supplier to another buyer. The mere finding that the other buyers of that supplier do factually not engage in active sales in that exclusive territory is not sufficient. The ruling is highly relevant from a practical perspective because it specifically concerns the contractual design and implementation of widespread exclusive distribution systems. The risks for companies in this context are complex: if such agreements are not sufficiently documented and can therefore not be proven, the restrictions may be invalid and the supplier may be liable for damages to the exclusive distributor to whom it had promised protection against active sales. In addition, the supplier runs the risk of violating antitrust law. We have already reported on this case more in detail (see Luther blog post here).
In October 2025, the European Commission imposed a fine totaling EUR 157 million on Gucci, Chloé and Loewe for vertical price fixing by their retailers (see press release here). For many years, the companies had restricted the ability of their retailers for apparel, leather goods, shoes and fashion accessories in online shops and brick-and-mortar stores to set their own retail prices and monitored compliance with these fixed prices (resale price maintenance). Specifically, the companies instructed their retailers not to deviate from the recommended retail prices, maximum discount rates and specific periods for sales and, in certain cases, the companies also did not allow their retailers to offer any discounts at all. The aim was to protect the price level in their own direct sales channels and thus protect their own sales from competition by their retailers. Overall, the European Commission emphasized that it wanted to send a strong signal to the fashion industry. Resale Price Maintenance thus remained one of the hot topics in 2025.
In April 2025, the Federal Cartel Office imposed fines totaling EUR 6 million on Sennheiser and Sonova. Both companies had systematically monitored the end consumer prices of their authorized retailers for audio products on an ongoing basis and intervened in particular when prices were significantly below the recommended retail price or following complaints from retailers that the current prices were inadequate. The authority considered the coordination measures between Sennheiser and Sonova and their dealers to manipulate end consumer prices.
It is no secret that Resale Price Maintenance will continue to be the hot topic in 2026 when it comes to ‘Verticals’, but other vertical topics will also play a role. In 2025, the Federal Cartel Office imposed fines of around EUR 6 million for prohibited vertical agreements (see annual report here). The anonymous whistleblower system received six hundred (!) tip-offs of competition violations. In addition, the current discussion on whether and how territorial supply constraints (see, for example, here), i.e. restrictions on supplies to certain areas wholesalers and retailers, can be prevented or punished brings even more focus to antitrust control of territorial allocations. Ultimately, in these cases, the focus will probably be on Article 102 TFEU, i.e., the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position.
The Federal Cartel Office just closed a precedent case against Amazon. In its decision (see here), the Federal Cartel Office prohibits Amazon to apply price control mechanisms on independent third-party sellers operating on its online marketplace (Amazon Marketplace). The company influenced the end customer prices of competing third-party sellers by either removing the offers in question from the marketplace altogether or by not displaying them in the prominently placed Buy Box, the Federal Cartel Office said. The proceedings were closed without a fine. However, for the first time, the Federal Cartel Office has opted to order the disgorgement of the economic benefits gained by Amazon through its anti-competitive behaviour (EUR 59 million) based on the recently introduced legal presumption to that end. Amazon has announced that it will appeal against the decision. A similar investigation targeting such (maximum) price control mechanisms is pending in view of Temu. With regard to Temu, which may – other than Amazon – potentially fall within the scope of the block exemption – it may for the first time be relevant that online intermediary services are now treated as suppliers of intermediary services within the meaning of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation, whereas ‘product suppliers’ are regarded as buyers.
In any case, companies must expect that their distribution systems could come under scrutiny by antitrust authorities in 2026. Distribution agreements which have already been in place should be reviewed in this regard, as well as new contracts. This applies to all industries and every company, regardless of the sector in question. For example, the Dutch competition authority is currently investigating price developments in the food sector (see here).
The automotive industry will also be in the focus of the European Commission’s activities for other reasons: In January 2025, the European Commission launched a public consultation on adapting the block exemption regulation in the motor vehicle sector to the digital transformation of the motor vehicle markets, with the next steps expected in 2026 (see here). Overall, vertical issues will remain highly relevant for companies in all sectors in 2026.
Abuse-of-dominance enforcement will remain robust in 2026 and will operate alongside digital-economy rules. Recent decisions on Google Android Auto (ECJ) and enforcement against Doctolib (cf. section H. below on merger control) (French Competition Authority) as well as the EU Commission’s dawn raids in the vaccines sector illustrate practical applications and breadth of use. A slowdown is not expected. For dominant undertakings, this means additional compliance risks; for customers, suppliers, and competitors, the tool continues to offer multiple avenues to address eventual abuses. The interaction with the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) will be particularly relevant (cf. section E. below on digital economy below).
In 2026, authorities may again favor commitment decisions over fines. Commitments enable rapid changes without establishing an infringement. In the SAP proceedings concerning alleged tying and terms for ERP maintenance services, the European Commission is assessing market feedback on commitments offered by SAP at the end of 2025. A commitment decision appears likely in 2026. Companies will have the chance to have new and existing SAP contracts adapted to their favor accordingly. Ensuring operational implementation may rest a challenge, though. Questions may also arise about damages claims for eventual past overpayments. The Federal Cartel Office is taking a similar approach in its ATTF proceedings against Apple and requested submissions on commitments at the end of 2025 (cf. section E. below on digital economy below).
The European Commission’s plan, within the reform of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, to fully align national abuse-of-dominance control - i.e., to prohibit stricter national law in the area of Article 102 TFEU as already applies under Article 101 TFEU - appears to be off the table for now. Different stakeholders, notably the Federal Cartel Office and the Austrian and French authorities, opposed the proposal. In Germany, the change would have affected Section 20 of the German Competition Act (“GWB”) (relative market power) and Sections 19 and 19a GWB. However, closer cooperation with the Commission may follow in cases where a national authority seeks to apply stricter national rules.
The revision of the Commission’s guidelines on exclusionary abuse is expected to conclude in 2026. Increased use of rebuttable presumptions is likely, aimed at speeding up proceedings and improving practical applicability. This change is controversial. It will likely represent a significant step away from the effects-based (“more economic”) approach.
Regulations on the Digital Economy remain the highest priority for the European Commission, the Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”) as well as other competition authorities throughout the world (possibly with the exception of the US). At the national level, Section 19a of the German Competition Act (“GWB”) has proven to be an effective instrument in view of companies with “paramount significance for competition across markets” (see here), often with effects reaching beyond Germany.
In 2025, the FCO reached an agreement with Google (Alphabet). In the future, Google will license its services as separate stand-alone versions and create the necessary conditions to enable interoperability with third-party services (see here and here). Google will also eliminate contractual provisions that restrict the combined use of its maps services with those of other providers (see here). Another case of Section 19a GWB to follow in 2026 is the ongoing assessment of solutions proposed by Apple in Apple’s App Tracking Transparency Framework (ATTF) proceedings (see here). The FCO argues that Apple’s more user friendly data consent prompts for its own apps, compared to those for third-party apps, raise competition concerns and lack transparency (see here).
Germany’s instruments to exercise control over digital platforms will remain in force after a discussion whether a EU-wide harmonization shall replace stricter national laws (see here). As of now, Section 19a GWB focuses on company-specific, case-by-case supervision of abusive practices, whereas the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) imposes broad conduct obligations on individual platform services (see current article here). Companies will therefore continue to operate in an environment characterised by complex parallel regulatory systems.
Additionally, there are ongoing discussions regarding amendments to the merger control thresholds which are strongly influenced by considerations pertaining to the digital economy. The FCO could not review several mergers in the digital economy such as Microsoft/OpenAI (see here) or the so called “acqui-hire” in the case of Microsoft/Inflection (see here) as neither thresholds were triggered nor the requirement of current substantial operations in Germany was satisfied. In its decision Meta/Kustomer, the Federal Court of Justice applies a broad scope of interpretation, assuming that indirect activities might amount to substantial domestic operations in Germany. A legal uncertainty remains for businesses (see here, p.15, 16). Possible instruments for reducing this uncertainty are discussed in more detail under the topic of merger control in Section G.
In 2025, the EU Commission conducted and, in some cases, concluded a large number of proceedings under the DMA. For example, it imposed sanctions under the DMA against Apple (for violating anti-steering rules) and Meta (for its pay-or-consent model). It also initiated and pursued further proceedings against Apple (app developer contract terms, interoperability obligations) and Alphabet (including self-preferencing, access conditions for publishers in Google Search, violation of anti-steering rules). Depending on the outcome those cases could form the basis for further proceedings in the area of private enforcement (see Section F. on private enforcement).
The Digital Markets Act, Digital Services Act (“DSA”)[1] and Artificial Intelligence Act (“AI Act”) form the framework for addressing technology based challenges such as for an open, free and competitive market as well as for Human Rights.
In March 2025, for example, the Italian Competition Authority initiated proceedings against various companies belonging to the Meta Group. During the ongoing proceedings, Meta changed its WhatsApp policy that would, from January 2026 onwards, block rival generative AI chatbots, from using the WhatsApp business service application. The reaction from the Competition Authorities in Italy and Brazil was clear and quick: They suspended Meta’s new WhatsApp policy for AI chatbots by way of interim measures. The European Commission followed the approach of the national competition authorities after one month and issued a Statement of Objections, on which Meta Platforms may respond. This is an interesting move as this is the first interim measure to be imposed by the European Commission since 2019 (Broadcom). Under Article 8 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission may adopt interim measures only in cases of urgency, where there is a risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition and a prima facie finding of an infringement of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU. If Meta cannot dispel the concerns raised by the European Commission, the European Commission could formally order the suspension of the new WhatsApp policy introduced at the beginning of the year. At the same time, national authorities, such as the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK, are arguing for a less speedy approach on artificial intelligence regulation as the pace of the development is too quick. Yet, the need to prepare and protect the financial system, especially in light of AI-related incidents, is highly discussed, as currently more than three quarters of UK financial services firms are using AI (see here).
Particularly with regard to the digital economy, the (political) divergence in relation to the Trump administration becomes more and more evident also in antitrust law enforcement. In the takeover battle between Netflix and Paramount over Warner Bros. (see here), doubts are growing as to whether proximity to the president could potentially have (too much) influence on the outcome of merger control proceedings in the future. Another example of the politicization of competition law is Trump’s threat to retaliate after the European Commission fined Google for antitrust violations, after the European Commission imposed a fine of EUR 2.95 billion on Google in abuse of dominance proceedings for anticompetitive practices in the area of online advertising (see here). He described the fine as discriminatory and threatened to impose tariffs should such measures continue (see here). Accordingly, the continued relevance of US antitrust law – and the possibility that EU authorities may (even implicitly) allow themselves to be influenced by it in their enforcement of EU law in the digital economy – will remain of particular interest in 2026 and beyond.
When forecasting developments in the field of private enforcement for 2026, it is worth noting at the outset that the political impetus for reform in this area – particularly regarding cartel damages litigation – has noticeably waned. The specific reform proposals put forward by the German Monopolies Commission to enhance the efficiency of cartel damages claims (such as the nationwide concentration of proceedings, the introduction of a presumption of minimum harm, or closer scrutiny of restrictions on third‑party litigation funding in representative actions) were not incorporated into the coalition agreement between the now governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The same applies to the 10-point paper published by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in 2022 for stronger protection of leniency applicants against cartel damages claims in order to bolster cartel enforcement.
From a procedural perspective, the established practice in Germany of pursuing bundled cartel damages claims through collective action service providers is expected to remain standard. On the one hand, the CJEU’s ruling in ASG 2 of 28 January 2025 (Case C‑253/23) confirmed that such collective action models fall under the protection of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, removing doubts as to their admissibility in cartel damages cases. On the other hand, the EU representative action mechanism – the so‑called “redress action” – remains unattractive in Germany due to rigid limitations on litigation funding, capping funders’ participation at 10% of the proceeds. Many potential claimants are likely to be deterred from complex antitrust damages proceedings, which require econometric damage calculations on their side, without litigation funders.
Costly econometric analyses on the claimant side would, however, become unnecessary if the legislator introduced a presumption of minimum harm – but such reform is neither in place nor on the horizon. Against this background, some courts are increasingly venturing into estimating damages without expert evidence, as exemplified by the widely noticed but also heavily criticized judgment of the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court of 20 November 2025 (Case 2 U 263/21). By contrast, a week‑long expert hearing before the Munich Regional Court I in the truck cartel litigation at the end of November 2025 – with more than 100 lawyers and economists involved – illustrates the immense effort required to achieve precision through econometric analysis. Accordingly, courts are likely to rely more frequently on judicial damage estimations going forward, and the approach taken by the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court – if upheld by the Federal Court of Justice– may well set a precedent. At the same time, “ex ante” contractual damage lump‑sum clauses (for instance in procurement agreements) are gaining significance as a valuable tool to mitigate cartel‑related risks, provided they are structured in line with legal requirements, in particular those of the German law on General Terms and Conditions.
In its 2024/25 annual report (see here), the Federal Cartel Office again underlined the key role of its leniency program as well as its anonymous whistleblower tool. The number of leniency applications rose from 14 in the previous year to 17. While leniency applicants may obtain immunity from fines, they continue to face the risk of complex and costly follow‑on damages claims. In an era of collective actions, litigation funders, and claimant law firms with specialized business models, enhanced protection for leniency applicants remains a topic under discussion. Given the large number of advanced follow‑on damages proceedings, upcoming decisions on contribution claims among cartel participants and the role of leniency applicants may well be expected.
Private enforcement is also likely to gain importance beyond traditional cartel damages claims in 2026, particularly with respect to the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”). The 11th amendment to the German Competition Act (“GWB”) established a procedural framework extending several litigation facilitations known from cartel damages law to DMA‑related claims. Practice in 2025 has made clear that German courts recognize the private enforceability of certain “self‑executing” gatekeeper obligations under Articles 5–7 DMA. For instance, in its judgment of 12 August 2025 (Case 12 HK O 32/24), the Mainz Regional Court ordered Google (Gmail) to cease conduct infringing Article 5(8) DMA (anti‑bundling). Other interim relief proceedings – such as the Cologne Higher Regional Court’s ruling of 23 May 2025 (Case 15 UKl 2/25) concerning a potential infringement of Article 5(2) DMA by a Meta subsidiary – demonstrate that the scope and interpretation of specific DMA obligations (e.g. on data combination, interface design, or anti‑circumvention) remain contested. For 2026, a gradual increase in DMA‑related claims seeking injunctive relief and declaratory judgments is expected, accompanied by clarification of procedural issues such as jurisdiction, cooperation between national courts and the European Commission under Article 39 DMA, and the interplay between national judgments and European Commission measures.
In parallel, Section 19a GWB continues to serve as a central instrument of national platform oversight. The Federal Cartel Office’s findings designating companies of “paramount significance across markets” (Alphabet/Google, Meta, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft) have meanwhile become final. In 2025, the authority refined its substantive assessments, notably vis‑à‑vis Amazon (price control mechanisms) and Google (automotive/maps). The more specific and settled behavioral obligations or commitments by these companies become, the more readily affected parties can build on them through civil claims for injunctions or damages. Accordingly, the year 2026 will likely see growth in “interface cases” (DMA obligations versus Section 19a GWB orders) and increased alignment between public/national and private enforcement avenues.
To conclude, the developments shaping the year 2026 are set to continue along multiple dimensions. The overarching challenge – managing the complex interplay between private antitrust enforcement and DMA application – will remain pressing for all stakeholders involved.
The extent to which call-in rights will be introduced for antitrust authorities will certainly remain a hot topic in 2026. Such call-in rights give antitrust authorities broad discretion to review transactions under merger control regimes. Numerous European member states have introduced this instrument in recent years. This discussion has gained significant momentum, particularly following the European Court of Justice's Illumina/Grail ruling in autumn 2024 (cf. here). Most recently, the President of the Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”), Andreas Mundt, also indicated that he was no longer opposed to introducing a call-in right for the FCO in Germany. Critics of this instrument complain about the lack of legal certainty. At the same time, however, the transaction value threshold (which in Germany is EUR 400 million) is also criticized for its lack of legal certainty, as (above all) the numerous recent court proceedings on the criterion of “significant domestic activity” demonstrate (see, for example, Federal Court of Justice, decision of 17 June 2025, Case KVR 77/22, Meta/Kustomer, cf. here). It remains to be seen whether the German lawmakers also identify a need for reform in this regard and will create the legal conditions for an adjustment of the FCO’s investigative powers in 2026.
Where there is a lack of call-in rights, antitrust authorities are sometimes exploring new ways to review transactions that fall below the thresholds for merger control scrutiny. This applies in particular to killer acquisitions (acquisitions of small, innovative companies by market-dominant companies). In 2025, the French antitrust authority in particular made headlines when it imposed a fine of EUR 4.7 million on Doctolib for abuse of market power in the area of online appointment scheduling and telemedicine consulting after the company had acquired its main competitor MonDocteur in 2018 – without the acquisition triggering a merger control notification requirement in France at the time (cf. here). At the same time, the Czech competition authority, for example, is already planning to introduce a “call-in” mechanism in order to be able to review the acquisition of innovative start-ups, among other things. In parallel, the current thresholds are to be raised from a total turnover of the parties to the merger in the Czech Republic of CZK 1.5 billion (approx. EUR 61 million) to CZK 2.5 billion (approx. EUR 103 million) in order to reduce routine notifications by 20-30%. The Bulgarian competition authority already introduced the call-in mechanism in 2025 in order to be able to take targeted action against killer acquisitions. The necessary pre-requisite only is that there is a total turnover of the parties to the merger in Bulgaria above of BGN 25 million (approx. EUR 13 million) and the fear of significant impairment of competition (e.g. through the creation or strengthening of a dominant market position).
I. In view of the approximately 900 merger notifications to the Federal Cartel Office in 2025 (with one prohibition, the takeover of three slaughterhouses from Vion by the Tönnies Group, cf. here), some voices are calling for the thresholds to be raised in order to relieve the workload of both the authority and companies. Proponents see the comparatively low thresholds as a strength of German merger control, as they give the Federal Cartel Office a comprehensive overview of transaction activity and of the markets affected. The Federal Cartel Office’s powers to review transactions have also been expanded in recent years. In 2023, the legislature introduced the provision in Section 32f of the German Competition Act (“GWB”). On this basis the Federal Cartel Office was able to oblige the Rethmann Group in November 2025 to notify mergers in the next three years even if they fall below the usual turnover thresholds (cf. here).
One issue that is currently being raised regularly regarding merger control is the topic of ‘competitiveness’ of the European economy. In reality, this topic goes far beyond merger control law, as it affects numerous areas of European economic policy, from tax legislation to wage and energy costs to securing supply chains. In the context of merger control, the main question is to what extent the creation of ‘European champions’ through mergers should be given preference over the existence of several strong competitors in the market. It will be interesting to see how these overarching competition policy issues will be reflected in the revision of the Merger Guidelines (cf. here) next year. However, a final version of the Guidelines is not expected before 2027.
There are also exciting developments outside Europe. Australia, for example, established a mandatory merger control regime in place on 1 January 2026. Transactions that exceed the thresholds must be approved by the Australian competition authority before they can be completed. In Mexico, the merger control thresholds were significantly lowered in 2025 in order to be able to review a larger number of transactions in the future. New Zealand plans to introduce call-in rights in 2026 to better detect “killer acquisitions”.
A first glance at 2026 reveals exciting developments in merger control at both national and international level, which will undoubtedly be influenced by the current economic and political challenges.
At the end of 2024, as part of the hospital reform, a far-reaching (though not comprehensive) exemption from German merger control for hospital transactions has been introduced. Pursuant to Section 187(10) of the German Competition Act (“GWB”), the German merger control provisions (Sections 35 ff. GWB) do not apply to concentrations in the hospital sector that involve cross-site consolidations of hospitals or individual medical specialties.
In addition, a written confirmation from the competent state authorities is required, stating that the concentration is necessary to improve hospital care and that no other competition law provisions conflict with the project. The transaction must also be completed by 31 December 2030.
Under the planned Hospital Reform Adjustment Act (Krankenhausreformanpassungsgesetz – “KHAG”), the exemption currently set out in Section 187(10) GWB shall be transferred to a new, standalone provision (proposed Section 186a GWB). The government draft of the KHAG also contains two relevant substantive changes/clarifications:
It remains to be seen whether and when these amendments will enter into force. The legislation is currently still in the parliamentary process. If the KHAG is enacted as planned, this would further extend the scope of the German merger control exemption for hospital mergers while at the same time providing necessary clarification.
The decarbonisation of industrial value chains remains a core objective of the European Union in 2026 and one of the priorities of Commissioner Teresa Ribera. EU competition law and its enforcement are also expected to contribute to the green transition. Well-functioning competition between undertakings, protected by competition law, is generally the best means of achieving sustainability goals effectively and efficiently. However, sustainability cooperation between undertakings can be an effective tool in individual cases, for example to achieve economies of scale or to avoid a first-mover disadvantage at the expense of an undertaking. The updated guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal cooperation agreements (Horizontal Guidelines) take this finding into account dedicating one chapter on sustainability cooperation and the application of the EU competition rules on such cooperation (see our blog post here).
In practice, however, uncertainties remain regarding the specific design of sustainability cooperation and its assessment under EU competition law. However, in order to obtain the highest possible legal certainty, undertakings can present their intended cooperation to the European Commission and request informal review in accordance with the European Commission Notice on Informal Guidance. This notice allows undertakings to seek advice from the European Commission on the application of EU competition rules to novel or unresolved issues.
On 9 July 2025, the European Commission issued its first such informal guidance letter in connection with a sustainability cooperation agreement (see here). The guidance remains applicable for five years. The subject of the informal review was a sustainability agreement in the transport sector aimed at accelerating the switch from diesel-powered to electric equipment for container transport in European ports:
The sustainability cooperation provides for joint purchasing and the establishment of minimum technical standards for battery-powered handling equipment. This equipment is currently mainly powered by diesel. The aim of the cooperation is to pool future demand, reduce costs, encourage investment by suppliers and improve the compatibility of charging systems. The aim is to promote decarbonisation in port operations.
The European Commission had no concerns regarding the implementation of this sustainability cooperation. However, in the European Commission's view, the undertakings involved in the cooperation must ensure the following:
However, the following still applies: the mere fact that a cooperation pursues sustainability goals does not protect it from the application of antitrust law. If undertakings consider entering into a sustainability cooperation, we recommend the following approach:
In June 2024, the foundation was laid for the development of a European carbon management infrastructure: by way of a regulation, the European Union set a binding target of achieving an annual CO2 injection capacity of at least 50 million tons by 2030. In the same year, Germany also reopened the door to carbon sequestration as a net-zero technology. In November 2025, under new political leadership, Germany adopted the Carbon-Dioxide-Storage-and-Transport-Act (“KSpTG”). This act harmonizes the legal framework for CO2 transport pipelines and introduces a range of instruments aimed at accelerating administrative permitting procedures. The changes in the field of carbon sequestration are, however, even more far reaching. The new law permits the industrial storage of CO2 in the exclusive economic zone (maritime continental margin) and on the continental shelf. In addition, research storage facilities are allowed throughout the federal territory. Whether and to which extent carbon sequestration on German territory will be permitted, however, is now a matter for the individual federal states to decide.
In principle, this could mean that the build-out can finally begin. But in practice, the sector is facing a classic chicken-and-egg problem. In order to inject CO2, transport infrastructure must first be in place. Building such infrastructure, in turn, presupposes the existence of emitters willing to capture CO2 and feed it into the system, thereby providing the basis for a viable business case. Conversely, few companies will invest in capital-intensive capture technologies as long as it remains uncertain whether transport and storage infrastructure will be available in time. Expert discussions, such as the recent CCS event hosted by Luther’s Düsseldorf-based EPR team (see post here (in German)), demonstrate that solutions to this dilemma are most likely to be found through cooperation. This has also been recognized by the European legislator. When obliging oil and gas producers under the aforementioned regulation to contribute to the achievement of the Union’s injection capacity target, it expressly allowed for cooperation mechanisms to that end. At this point, competition law comes into play:
All cooperations must always meet the standards of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The establishment and operation of carbon dioxide pipelines and storage facilities are, in principle, in prior public interest (cf. Section 4 KSpTG). There will therefore be no doubt that such cooperations are generally permissible under antitrust law ‘as such’. However, the KSpTG does not provide ‘carte blanche’ under antitrust law. Companies must adhere to competition law when it comes to the specific manner of how a cooperation is established and operated. The following two aspects will be particularly relevant for companies (while in case of a cooperation in the form of a joint venture, the need for a merger control notification must also be examined):
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