Luther Competition Forecast 2026

• In 2026, several major antitrust proceedings are expected to be concluded and substantial fines imposed, both nationally by the Federal Cartel Office and at European level.
• Investigative practices in 2026 will likely entail a high number of unannounced searches ("dawn raids") and could increasingly be accompanied by AI-supported market data analyses.
• Preventive compliance will continue to gain importance, in particular through the use of whistleblower systems, compliance trainings and digital monitoring tools recording business transactions relevant to antitrust compliance.
• In 2026, antitrust authorities will continue to focus inter alia on labor market-related violations (wage fixing, no-poach agreements) and on monitoring new trends in the use of artificial intelligence.

The relatively small amount of fines imposed by the Federal Cartel Office for (horizontal) cartels of EUR 4 million does not reflect a decreasing determination of the Federal Cartel Office – on the contrary, several major cases are still pending, which are likely to lead to the imposition of fines in 2026. The European Commission (“Commission”), for its part, recently imposed fines totaling EUR 72 million on manufacturers of automotive starter batteries (cf. here). Several proceedings are also still pending at European level.

Considering the increased investigative activities of the Federal Cartel Office and the European Commission in the past year and the announcements made by the authorities, resolute prosecution of antitrust law infringements can also be expected for 2026.

In 2025 alone, the Federal Cartel Office conducted ten unannounced searches (‘dawn raids’) at several companies because of suspected antitrust law infringements. It is fair to predict that we may see a similar number of dawn raids in 2026. According to its own statements, the Federal Cartel Office is receiving increasing reports of alleged antitrust law infringements through a wide variety of channels, which often form the basis for further investigations, including dawn raids. The European Commission also remains active in this field, a trend that will most likely continue in 2026. For example, at the end of October, companies in the ski equipment sector were raided on suspicion of cartel agreements (cf. here). The judgements handed down in recent months, which have tended to facilitate obtaining  search warrants (cf. here) and are likely to further encourage authorities in their investigative efforts. In this context, it will be interesting to see how the General Court of the European Union will decide on Red Bull’s action, in which the company seeks to have the European Commission (rather than Red Bull) bear the costs of a continued inspection (Case T-882/24, cf. here). Under this practice, the European Commission conducts the search of seized data not on site at the companies’ premises, but in Brussels. In January 2026, the General Court held an oral hearing, in which Red Bull emphasized its claim to have the costs for the transfer recovered.

With regard to the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, the European Commission and the Federal Cartel Office (without citing specific figures lately) have both emphasized that leniency applications remain a key tool for initially identifying possible antitrust law infringements. In 2026, the Federal Cartel Office will continue to intensify its screening of market data in order to identify anomalies that indicate anti-competitive behavior. According to its own statements, the Federal Cartel Office has been inspired by the Danish competition authority, which uses algorithms, among other things, to screen bidding behavior in public tenders for suspicious patterns. The fact that these measures, some of which are AI-supported, are actually successful is demonstrated not least by the European Commission's antitrust proceedings against Michelin, in which the initial suspicion was largely caused by AI-based examination of publicly available sources (such as earnings calls) (cf. here).

In view of the significant number of dawn raids, AI-supported market screenings and the consistent prosecution of anti-competitive behavior, preventive compliance will continue to gain importance for companies in 2026. Measures that can be taken proactively or should be taken (depending on the specific risk exposure) include the establishment of internal whistleblower systems  (even below legal thresholds, if necessary), regular antitrust compliance trainings, preventive internal investigations and the systematic documentation of business processes that could potentially be relevant under antitrust law. Companies that take proactive measures in this area can not only reduce the risk of fines by avoiding violations, but also benefit from a reduction in fines in the event of an investigation. Hence, the role of comprehensive compliance monitoring is likely to continue to grow, especially in multinational corporations.

It can be assumed that one focus of public antitrust enforcement will remain on anti-competitive labor market practices. In recent years, an enforcement priority has particularly been wage-fixing (agreements between employers on wages and other remuneration) and no-poach agreements (agreements between employers on prohibiting the poaching of employees) (see Luther Competition Forecast 2025, Section I, cf. here). In 2026, a milestone in this regard will certainly be the judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Tondela case (Case C-133/24, cf. here), in which the highest European court will rule for the first time on ‘no-poach agreements’ – at the height of the Covid-pandemic, Portuguese football clubs agreed in the 2019-2020 season not to sign new contracts with each other’s football players. Will the European Court of Justice classify the clubs' behavior as justified in light of the pandemic?

In addition to AI-supported analyses by authorities, digital monitoring and the use of AI by companies themselves will also become more important in 2026. Digital monitoring tools, AI-supported analyses of business transactions and the systematic evaluation of market data can help to identify and document suspicious patterns at an early stage. The increasing digitization of investigative practices will thus both increase market transparency as well as the probability of detection and hence intensify the pressure on companies to implement proactive antitrust compliance.

Last but not least, the topic of artificial intelligence will continue to play a central role in antitrust enforcement in 2026. Artificial intelligence opens up new opportunities for competitors to exchange information in an anti-competitive manner or to coordinate prices with each other. At the same time, German politicians are endeavoring to create competition-oriented AI ecosystems (inter alia to increase digital sovereignty), as shown in particular by the expert commission on competition and artificial intelligence established in 2025 (cf. here). Its proposals (for example on the functionality of competition as such or on creating an effective and high-performing  IT-infrastructure) are expected in 2026.

• "Resale price maintenance" will remain a key issue in 2026, with a continued strict enforcement of the prohibition of vertical price fixing.
• The ECJ ruling in the "Beemster Kaas" case clarified the requirements for the contractual design of exclusive distribution systems with regard to the documentation and verifiability of the required exclusivity arrangements.
• In 2026, companies across all industries must be aware of the risk of reviews of their distribution systems by antitrust authorities; moreover, adjustments to the legal framework for the block exemption in the automotive sector are imminent.

It does not take ‘rocket science’ to realize that ‘verticals’ will remain highly relevant in 2026. Vertical competition law infringements are and will be enforced in the same way as horizontal cartel agreements. This blogpost highlights a few cases which had been relevant in 2025 and takes a look ahead at the challenges that could be relevant in 2026.

I. European Court of Justice in "Beemster Kaas" case: requirements for exclusive distribution systems

In May 2025, the European Court of Justice further clarified the antitrust requirements for exclusive distribution agreements in a landmark ruling in the "Beemster Kaas" case (Case C-581/23, available here): The European Court of Justice confirmed that an exclusive distribution agreement requires that all (!) buyers excluded from an exclusive territory must agree – expressly or at least tacitly – not to make any active sales into the territory exclusively allocated by the supplier to another buyer. The mere finding that the other buyers of that supplier do factually not engage in active sales in that exclusive territory is not sufficient. The ruling is highly relevant from a practical perspective because it specifically concerns the contractual design and implementation of widespread exclusive distribution systems. The risks for companies in this context are complex: if such agreements are not sufficiently documented and can therefore not be proven, the restrictions may be invalid and the supplier may be liable for damages to the exclusive distributor to whom it had promised protection against active sales. In addition, the supplier runs the risk of violating antitrust law. We have already reported on this case more in detail (see Luther blog post here).

II. European Commission: Price fixing in the luxury segment – EUR 157 million.

In October 2025, the European Commission imposed a fine totaling EUR 157 million on Gucci, Chloé and Loewe for vertical price fixing by their retailers (see press release here). For many years, the companies had restricted the ability of their retailers for apparel, leather goods, shoes and fashion accessories in online shops and brick-and-mortar stores to set their own retail prices and monitored compliance with these fixed prices (resale price maintenance). Specifically, the companies instructed their retailers not to deviate from the recommended retail prices, maximum discount rates and specific periods for sales and, in certain cases, the companies also did not allow their retailers to offer any discounts at all. The aim was to protect the price level in their own direct sales channels and thus protect their own sales from competition by their retailers. Overall, the European Commission emphasized that it wanted to send a strong signal to the fashion industry. Resale Price Maintenance thus remained one of the hot topics in 2025.

III. Federal Cartel Office: Price fixing for premium headphones – EUR 6 million

In April 2025, the Federal Cartel Office imposed fines totaling EUR 6 million on Sennheiser and Sonova. Both companies had systematically monitored the end consumer prices of their authorized retailers for audio products on an ongoing basis and intervened in particular when prices were significantly below the recommended retail price or following complaints from retailers that the current prices were inadequate. The authority considered the coordination measures between Sennheiser and Sonova and their dealers to manipulate end consumer prices.

IV. 2026 – what's ahead?

It is no secret that Resale Price Maintenance will continue to be the hot topic in 2026 when it comes to ‘Verticals’, but other vertical topics will also play a role. In 2025, the Federal Cartel Office imposed fines of around EUR 6 million for prohibited vertical  agreements (see annual report here). The anonymous whistleblower system received six hundred (!) tip-offs of competition violations. In addition, the current discussion on whether and how territorial supply constraints (see, for example, here), i.e. restrictions on supplies to certain areas wholesalers and retailers, can be prevented or punished brings even more focus to antitrust control of territorial allocations. Ultimately, in these cases, the focus will probably be on Article 102 TFEU, i.e., the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position.

We are also awaiting the outcome of the proceedings initiated by the Federal Cartel Office against Amazon and Temu;  the Federal Cartel Office is investigating whether the platforms are imposing impermissible maximum price restrictions on the product suppliers selling through them (see here). In this case, it could be relevant — at least with regard to Temu – (for the first time) that online intermediary services are now treated as suppliers of intermediary services within the meaning of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation, while “product suppliers” are considered buyers within the meaning of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation. (Amazon is unlikely to fall under the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation anyway due to its high market share).

In any case, companies must expect that their distribution systems could come under scrutiny by antitrust authorities in 2026. Distribution agreements which have already been in place should be reviewed in this regard, as well as new contracts. This applies to all industries and every company, regardless of the sector in question. For example, the Dutch competition authority is currently investigating price developments in the food sector (see here). 

The automotive industry will also be in the focus of the European Commission’s activities for other reasons: In January 2025, the European Commission launched a public consultation on adapting the block exemption regulation in the motor vehicle sector to the digital transformation of the motor vehicle markets, with the next steps expected in 2026 (see here). Overall, vertical issues will remain highly relevant for companies in all sectors in 2026.

• Abuse of dominance enforcement will remain a key enforcement tool of antitrust law in 2026, which will continue to have broad practical relevance alongside special regulations for the digital economy, such as the Digital Markets Act.
• Authorities increasingly favor commitment decisions over fines to bring about faster changes in line with antitrust law.
• The full harmonization of national dominance rules as contemplated by the EU Commission will apparently not be implemented in the ongoing reform of Reg. 1/2003; stricter national regulations, such as Sections  19, 19a and 20 Geman Competition Act (GWB) in particular, will remain applicable.
• The final publication of new EU guidelines on exclusionary conduct is expected in 2026; these will probably rely more heavily on presumption rules and to some extent step away from the previous "more economic approach".

Abuse-of-dominance enforcement will remain robust in 2026 and will operate alongside digital-economy rules. Recent decisions on Google Android Auto (ECJ) and enforcement against Doctolib (cf. section H. below on merger control) (French Competition Authority) as well as the EU Commission’s dawn raids in the vaccines sector illustrate practical applications and breadth of use. A slowdown is not expected. For dominant undertakings, this means additional compliance risks; for customers, suppliers, and competitors, the tool continues to offer multiple avenues to address eventual abuses. The interaction with the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) will be particularly relevant (cf. section E. below on digital economy below).

In 2026, authorities may again favor commitment decisions over fines. Commitments enable rapid changes without establishing an infringement. In the SAP proceedings concerning alleged tying and terms for ERP maintenance services, the European Commission is assessing market feedback on commitments offered by SAP at the end of 2025. A commitment decision appears likely in 2026. Companies will have the chance to have new and existing SAP contracts adapted to their favor accordingly. Ensuring operational implementation may rest a challenge, though. Questions may also arise about damages claims for eventual past overpayments. The Federal Cartel Office is taking a similar approach in its ATTF proceedings against Apple and requested submissions on commitments at the end of 2025 (cf. section E. below on digital economy below). 

The European Commission’s plan, within the reform of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, to fully align national abuse-of-dominance control - i.e., to prohibit stricter national law in the area of Article 102 TFEU as already applies under Article 101 TFEU - appears to be off the table for now. Different stakeholders, notably the Federal Cartel Office and the Austrian and French authorities, opposed the proposal. In Germany, the change would have affected Section 20 of the German Competition Act (“GWB”) (relative market power) and Sections 19 and 19a GWB. However, closer cooperation with the Commission may follow in cases where a national authority seeks to apply stricter national rules.

The revision of the Commission’s guidelines on exclusionary abuse is expected to conclude in 2026. Increased use of rebuttable presumptions is likely, aimed at speeding up proceedings and improving practical applicability. This change is controversial. It will likely represent a significant step away from the effects-based (“more economic”) approach.

• Section 19a GWB has established itself as the central national instrument for abuse control vis-à-vis digital corporations such as Google, Amazon and Apple; strict German rules continue to apply despite discussions about EU-wide harmonization.
• In the area of merger control, legal uncertainties remain regarding the coverage of mergers by foreign companies in the digital economy; lower thresholds and alternative review regimes (such as call-in powers) and the interpretation of the requirement for significant domestic activity by the merging companies are under debate.
• Global developments, such as national measures against competition violations in the dynamically developing AI economy, political influences in the US on the enforcement of competition law and new international agreements in the Asia-Pacific region will determine the challenges of effective antitrust protection in the digital economy in 2026.

I. National instruments in the Digital Economy

Regulations on the Digital Economy remain the highest priority for the European Commission, the Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”) as well as other competition authorities throughout the world (possibly with the exception of the US). At the national level, Section 19a of the German Competition Act (“GWB”) has proven to be an effective instrument in view of companies with “paramount significance for competition across markets” (see here), often with effects reaching beyond Germany. 

In 2025, the FCO reached an agreement with Google (Alphabet). In the future, Google will license its services as separate stand-alone versions and create the necessary conditions to enable interoperability with third-party services (see here and here). Google will also eliminate contractual provisions that restrict the combined use of its maps services with those of other providers (see here). Another case of Section 19a GWB to follow in 2026 is the ongoing assessment of solutions proposed by Apple in Apple’s App Tracking Transparency Framework (ATTF) proceedings (see here). The FCO argues that Apple’s more user friendly data consent prompts for its own apps, compared to those for third-party apps, raise competition concerns and lack transparency (see here).

Germany’s instruments to exercise control over digital platforms will remain in force after a discussion whether a EU-wide harmonization shall replace stricter national laws (see here). As of now, Section 19a GWB focuses on company-specific, case-by-case supervision of abusive practices, whereas the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) imposes broad conduct obligations on individual platform services (see current article here). Companies will therefore continue to operate in an environment characterised by complex parallel regulatory systems.

Additionally, there are ongoing discussions regarding amendments to the merger control thresholds which are strongly influenced by considerations pertaining to the digital economy. The FCO could not review several mergers in the digital economy such as Microsoft/OpenAI (see here) or the so called “acqui-hire” in the case of Microsoft/Inflection (see here) as neither thresholds were triggered nor the requirement of current substantial operations in Germany was satisfied. In its decision Meta/Kustomer, the Federal Court of Justice applies a broad scope of interpretation, assuming that indirect activities might amount to substantial domestic operations in Germany. A legal uncertainty remains for businesses (see here, p.15, 16). Possible instruments for reducing this uncertainty are discussed in more detail under the topic of merger control in Section G.

II. DMA enforcement 

In 2025, the EU Commission conducted and, in some cases, concluded a large number of proceedings under the DMA. For example, it imposed sanctions under the DMA against Apple (for violating anti-steering rules) and Meta (for its pay-or-consent model). It also initiated and pursued further proceedings against Apple (app developer contract terms, interoperability obligations) and Alphabet (including self-preferencing, access conditions for publishers in Google Search, violation of anti-steering rules). Depending on the outcome those cases could form the basis for further proceedings in the area of private enforcement (see Section F. on private enforcement).

III. Worldwide views on technology based challenges

The Digital Markets Act, Digital Services Act (“DSA”)^[1] and Artificial Intelligence Act (“AI Act”) form the framework for addressing technology based challenges such as for an open, free and competitive market as well as for Human Rights.

In March 2025, for example, the Italian Competition Authority initiated proceedings against various companies belonging to the Meta Group. During the ongoing proceedings, Meta changed its WhatsApp policy that would, from January 2026 onwards, block rival generative AI chatbots, from using the WhatsApp business service application. The reaction from the Competition Authorities in Italy and Brazil was clear and quick: They suspended Meta’s new WhatsApp policy for AI chatbots by way of interim measures. The European Commission recently contemplated similar considerations which have, however, not been put in place to date. At the same time, national authorities, such as the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK, are arguing for a less speedy approach on artificial intelligence regulation as the pace of the development is too quick. Yet, the need to prepare and protect the financial system, especially in light of AI-related incidents, is highly discussed, as currently more than three quarters of UK financial services firms are using AI (see here).

Particularly with regard to the digital economy, the (political) divergence in relation to the Trump administration becomes more and more evident also in antitrust law enforcement. In the takeover battle between Netflix and Paramount over Warner Bros. (see here), doubts are growing as to whether proximity to the president could potentially have (too much) influence on the outcome of merger control proceedings in the future. Another example of the politicization of competition law is Trump’s threat to retaliate after the European Commission fined Google for antitrust violations, after the European Commission imposed a fine of EUR 2.95 billion on Google in abuse of dominance proceedings for anticompetitive practices in the area of online advertising (see here). He described the fine as discriminatory and threatened to impose tariffs should such measures continue (see here). Accordingly, the continued relevance of US antitrust law – and the possibility that EU authorities may (even implicitly) allow themselves to be influenced by it in their enforcement of EU law in the digital economy – will remain of particular interest in 2026 and beyond.

[1] The Digital Services Act “broadly applies” to intermediary service providers offering their services within the European Union. The main goal of the DSA is to establish a digital space in which the fundamental rights of the general public and of demand-side users are safeguarded.

• The legislative zeal for antitrust damages reform has noticeably waned in 2026; relevant proposals, such as those on nationwide concentration of proceedings, the introduction of a presumption of minimum harm and a stronger protection of leniency applicants, have not been implemented.
• Collective action collection models remain the primary means of pursuing antitrust damages claims, while complex proceedings are difficult to enforce without litigation funders.
• Courts are increasingly estimating damages without expert evidence; at the same time, the importance of ex ante agreed lump-sum damages is increasing.
• Private enforcement is becoming increasingly important in the digital economy, as courts are confirming initial DMA claims and regulatory orders under Section 19a GWB are now legally binding and enforceable under civil law; this means that private and public enforcement are likely to occur in parallel

When forecasting developments in the field of private enforcement for 2026, it is worth noting at the outset that the political impetus for reform in this area – particularly regarding cartel damages litigation – has noticeably waned. The specific reform proposals put forward by the German Monopolies Commission to enhance the efficiency of cartel damages claims (such as the nationwide concentration of proceedings, the introduction of a presumption of minimum harm, or closer scrutiny of restrictions on third‑party litigation funding in representative actions) were not incorporated into the coalition agreement between the now governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The same applies to the 10-point paper published by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in 2022 for stronger protection of leniency applicants against cartel damages claims in order to bolster cartel enforcement.

From a procedural perspective, the established practice in Germany of pursuing bundled cartel damages claims through collective action service providers is expected to remain standard. On the one hand, the CJEU’s ruling in ASG 2 of 28 January 2025 (Case C‑253/23) confirmed that such collective action models fall under the protection of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, removing doubts as to their admissibility in cartel damages cases. On the other hand, the EU representative action mechanism – the so‑called “redress action” – remains unattractive in Germany due to rigid limitations on litigation funding, capping funders’ participation at 10% of the proceeds. Many potential claimants are likely to be deterred from complex antitrust damages proceedings, which require econometric damage calculations on their side, without litigation funders.

Costly econometric analyses on the claimant side would, however, become unnecessary if the legislator introduced a presumption of minimum harm – but such reform is neither in place nor on the horizon. Against this background, some courts are increasingly venturing into estimating damages without expert evidence, as exemplified by the widely noticed but also heavily criticized judgment of the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court of 20 November 2025 (Case 2 U 263/21). By contrast, a week‑long expert hearing before the Munich Regional Court I in the truck cartel litigation at the end of November 2025 – with more than 100 lawyers and economists involved – illustrates the immense effort required to achieve precision through econometric analysis. Accordingly, courts are likely to rely more frequently on judicial damage estimations going forward, and the approach taken by the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court – if upheld by the Federal Court of Justice– may well set a precedent. At the same time, “ex ante” contractual damage lump‑sum clauses (for instance in procurement agreements) are gaining significance as a valuable tool to mitigate cartel‑related risks, provided they are structured in line with legal requirements, in particular those of the German law on General Terms and Conditions.

In its 2024/25 annual report (see here), the Federal Cartel Office again underlined the key role of its leniency program as well as its anonymous whistleblower tool. The number of leniency applications rose from 14 in the previous year to 17. While leniency applicants may obtain immunity from fines, they continue to face the risk of complex and costly follow‑on damages claims. In an era of collective actions, litigation funders, and claimant law firms with specialized business models, enhanced protection for leniency applicants remains a topic under discussion. Given the large number of advanced follow‑on damages proceedings, upcoming decisions on contribution claims among cartel participants and the role of leniency applicants may well be expected.

Private enforcement is also likely to gain importance beyond traditional cartel damages claims in 2026, particularly with respect to the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”). The 11th amendment to the German Competition Act (“GWB”) established a procedural framework extending several litigation facilitations known from cartel damages law to DMA‑related claims. Practice in 2025 has made clear that German courts recognize the private enforceability of certain “self‑executing” gatekeeper obligations under Articles 5–7 DMA. For instance, in its judgment of 12 August 2025 (Case 12 HK O 32/24), the Mainz Regional Court ordered Google (Gmail) to cease conduct infringing Article 5(8) DMA (anti‑bundling). Other interim relief proceedings – such as the Cologne Higher Regional Court’s ruling of 23 May 2025 (Case 15 UKl 2/25) concerning a potential infringement of Article 5(2) DMA by a Meta subsidiary – demonstrate that the scope and interpretation of specific DMA obligations (e.g. on data combination, interface design, or anti‑circumvention) remain contested. For 2026, a gradual increase in DMA‑related claims seeking injunctive relief and declaratory judgments is expected, accompanied by clarification of procedural issues such as jurisdiction, cooperation between national courts and the European Commission under Article 39 DMA, and the interplay between national judgments and European Commission measures.

In parallel, Section 19a GWB continues to serve as a central instrument of national platform oversight. The Federal Cartel Office’s findings designating companies of “paramount significance across markets” (Alphabet/Google, Meta, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft) have meanwhile become final. In 2025, the authority refined its substantive assessments, notably vis‑à‑vis Amazon (price control mechanisms) and Google (automotive/maps). The more specific and settled behavioral obligations or commitments by these companies become, the more readily affected parties can build on them through civil claims for injunctions or damages. Accordingly, the year 2026 will likely see growth in “interface cases” (DMA obligations versus Section 19a GWB orders) and increased alignment between public/national and private enforcement avenues.

To conclude, the developments shaping the year 2026 are set to continue along multiple dimensions. The overarching challenge – managing the complex interplay between private antitrust enforcement and DMA application – will remain pressing for all stakeholders involved.

• The debate on new "call-in" rights for antitrust authorities remains a central topic of merger control in 2026.
• "Killer acquisitions" continue to be a reason why the merger control thresholds and review rights are being discussed and adapted at the national level.
• A possible raise of the thresholds is intended to reduce routine notifications and make the work of the authority more efficient.
• The question of whether mergers should create European champions or competitive diversity is influencing the revision of the Merger Guidelines.

The extent to which call-in rights will be introduced for antitrust authorities will certainly remain a hot topic in 2026. Such call-in rights give antitrust authorities broad discretion to review transactions under merger control regimes. Numerous European member states have introduced this instrument in recent years. This discussion has gained significant momentum, particularly following the European Court of Justice's Illumina/Grail ruling in autumn 2024 (cf. here). Most recently, the President of the Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”), Andreas Mundt, also indicated that he was no longer opposed to introducing a call-in right for the FCO in Germany. Critics of this instrument complain about the lack of legal certainty. At the same time, however, the transaction value threshold (which in Germany is EUR 400 million) is also criticized for its lack of legal certainty, as (above all) the numerous recent court proceedings on the criterion of “significant domestic activity” demonstrate (see, for example, Federal Court of Justice, decision of 17 June 2025, Case KVR 77/22, Meta/Kustomer, cf. here). It remains to be seen whether the German lawmakers also identify a need for reform in this regard and will create the legal conditions for an adjustment of the FCO’s investigative powers in 2026.

Where there is a lack of call-in rights, antitrust authorities are sometimes exploring new ways to review transactions that fall below the thresholds for merger control scrutiny. This applies in particular to killer acquisitions (acquisitions of small, innovative companies by market-dominant companies). In 2025, the French antitrust authority in particular made headlines when it imposed a fine of EUR 4.7 million on Doctolib for abuse of market power in the area of online appointment scheduling and telemedicine consulting after the company had acquired its main competitor MonDocteur in 2018 – without the acquisition triggering a merger control notification requirement in France at the time (cf. here). At the same time, the Czech competition authority, for example, is already planning to introduce a “call-in” mechanism in order to be able to review the acquisition of innovative start-ups, among other things. In parallel, the current thresholds are to be raised from a total turnover of the parties to the merger in the Czech Republic of CZK 1.5 billion (approx. EUR 61 million) to CZK 2.5 billion (approx. EUR 103 million) in order to reduce routine notifications by 20-30%. The Bulgarian competition authority already introduced the call-in mechanism in 2025 in order to be able to take targeted action against killer acquisitions. The necessary pre-requisite only is that there is a total turnover of the parties to the merger in Bulgaria above of BGN 25 million (approx. EUR 13 million) and the fear of significant impairment of competition (e.g. through the creation or strengthening of a dominant market position).

I. In view of the approximately 900 merger notifications to the Federal Cartel Office in 2025 (with one prohibition, the takeover of three slaughterhouses from Vion by the Tönnies Group, cf. here), some voices are calling for the thresholds to be raised in order to relieve the workload of both the authority and companies. Proponents see the comparatively low thresholds as a strength of German merger control, as they give the Federal Cartel Office a comprehensive overview of transaction activity and of the markets affected. The Federal Cartel Office’s powers to review transactions have also been expanded in recent years. In 2023, the legislature introduced the provision in Section 32f of the German Competition Act (“GWB”). On this basis the Federal Cartel Office was able to oblige the Rethmann Group in November 2025 to notify mergers in the next three years even if they fall below the usual turnover thresholds (cf. here).

One issue that is currently being raised regularly regarding merger control is the topic of ‘competitiveness’ of the European economy. In reality, this topic goes far beyond merger control law, as it affects numerous areas of European economic policy, from tax legislation to wage and energy costs to securing supply chains. In the context of merger control, the main question is to what extent the creation of ‘European champions’ through mergers should be given preference over the existence of several strong competitors in the market. It will be interesting to see how these overarching competition policy issues will be reflected in the revision of the Merger Guidelines (cf. here) next year. However, a final version of the Guidelines is not expected before 2027.

There are also exciting developments outside Europe. Australia, for example, established a mandatory merger control regime in place on 1 January 2026. Transactions that exceed the thresholds must be approved by the Australian competition authority before they can be completed. In Mexico, the merger control thresholds were significantly lowered in 2025 in order to be able to review a larger number of transactions in the future. New Zealand plans to introduce call-in rights in 2026 to better detect “killer acquisitions”.

A first glance at 2026 reveals exciting developments in merger control at both national and international level, which will undoubtedly be influenced by the current economic and political challenges.

• At the end of 2024, a sector-specific exemption from German merger control was introduced for certain hospital mergers. Among other requirements, the exemption requires cross-site consolidations and an official confirmation that the transaction improves hospital care.
• The exemption only applies if the project is completed by 31 December 2030 and no other competition law provisions prevent it.
• According to the draft law (“KHAG”), any form of merger within the meaning of Section 37 German Antitrust Act (“GWB”) will in the future be exempted from German merger control; a cross-site consolidation will no longer be required.
• The draft KHAG also clarifies that the sector-specific exemption will only apply to inpatient hospital services, while MVZs (medical care centers) and other “ancillary hospital activities” remain subject to German merger control.

At the end of 2024, as part of the hospital reform, a far-reaching (though not comprehensive) exemption from German merger control for hospital transactions has been introduced. Pursuant to Section 187(10) of the German Competition Act (“GWB”), the German merger control provisions (Sections 35 ff. GWB) do not apply to concentrations in the hospital sector that involve cross-site consolidations of hospitals or individual medical specialties.

In addition, a written confirmation from the competent state authorities is required, stating that the concentration is necessary to improve hospital care and that no other competition law provisions conflict with the project. The transaction must also be completed by 31 December 2030.

Under the planned Hospital Reform Adjustment Act (Krankenhausreformanpassungsgesetz – “KHAG”), the exemption currently set out in Section 187(10) GWB shall be transferred to a new, standalone provision (proposed Section 186a GWB). The government draft of the KHAG also contains two relevant substantive changes/clarifications:

1. In the future, a cross-site consolidation of hospitals will no longer be required for the exemtion to apply; instead, the proposed Section 186a GWB will refer to the general concentration criteria set out in Section 37 GWB.
2. The draft further clarifies that the merger control exemption applies only to inpatient hospital services; medical care centers and other “ancillary activities” of hospitals are not covered. Concentrations involving these (non-inpatient) areas still must be notified to the Federal Cartel Office if the relevant merger control thresholds in Section 35 GWB are exceeded.

It remains to be seen whether and when these amendments will enter into force. The legislation is currently still in the parliamentary process. If the KHAG is enacted as planned, this would further extend the scope of the German merger control exemption for hospital mergers while at the same time providing necessary clarification.

I. Sustainability Cooperation in EU Competition Law – Commission Provides Further Guidance for Practitioners 

• In its updated Horizontal Guidelines the European Commission provides guidance on the permissibility of sustainability cooperations when the prohibition of cartels applies.
• For legal certainty, it is highly recommended to seek informal guidance from the European Commission and potentially limit the geographical scope of the cooperation to the EEA.
• The EU’s Commissioner for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition – Teresa Ribera – aims to accelerate and simplify such informal consultations allowing businesses to ask for informal guidance. In 2026, the political climate remains favorable for businesses to seek the European Commission’s informal guidance on the application of EU competition rules to novel questions concerning their sustainability cooperation.
• It remains to be seen whether the European Commission will be increasingly approached by businesses (especially those active in emission intensive sectors) seeking informal guidance on sustainability cooperations, resulting in further legal certainty on the application of EU competition rules on sustainability cooperation. 

The decarbonisation of industrial value chains remains a core objective of the European Union in 2026 and one of the priorities of Commissioner Teresa Ribera. EU competition law and its enforcement are also expected to contribute to the green transition. Well-functioning competition between undertakings, protected by competition law, is generally the best means of achieving sustainability goals effectively and efficiently. However, sustainability cooperation between undertakings can be an effective tool in individual cases, for example to achieve economies of scale or to avoid a first-mover disadvantage at the expense of an undertaking. The updated guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal cooperation agreements (Horizontal Guidelines) take this finding into account dedicating one chapter on sustainability cooperation and the application of the EU competition rules on such cooperation (see our blog post here).

In practice, however, uncertainties remain regarding the specific design of sustainability cooperation and its assessment under EU competition law. However, in order to obtain the highest possible legal certainty, undertakings can present their intended cooperation to the European Commission and request informal review in accordance with the European Commission Notice on Informal Guidance. This notice allows undertakings to seek advice from the European Commission on the application of EU competition rules to novel or unresolved issues. 

On 9 July 2025, the European Commission issued its first such informal guidance letter in connection with a sustainability cooperation agreement (see here). The guidance remains applicable for five years. The subject of the informal review was a sustainability agreement in the transport sector aimed at accelerating the switch from diesel-powered to electric equipment for container transport in European ports: 

The sustainability cooperation provides for joint purchasing and the establishment of minimum technical standards for battery-powered handling equipment. This equipment is currently mainly powered by diesel. The aim of the cooperation is to pool future demand, reduce costs, encourage investment by suppliers and improve the compatibility of charging systems. The aim is to promote decarbonisation in port operations.

The European Commission had no concerns regarding the implementation of this sustainability cooperation. However, in the European Commission's view, the undertakings involved in the cooperation must ensure the following: 

• Each operator must continue to be allowed to purchase handling equipment independently.
• The bundled demand must be limited to a certain volume.
• The exchange of sensitive data must be limited to what is necessary for the implementation of the cooperation.

However, the following still applies: the mere fact that a cooperation pursues sustainability goals does not protect it from the application of antitrust law. If undertakings consider entering into a sustainability cooperation, we recommend the following approach: 

• Early consultation with the Commission and legal certainty through an informal guidance letter. Other national antitrust authorities in the EU also offer informal advice.
• Where applicable agreeing suitable rules limiting the negative competitive effects of horizontal cooperation, for example rules on voluntary participation, exit options or restrictions on the exchange of information.
• Underakting should bear in mind that an informal guidance letter from the Commission has no effect outside the EU or the European Economic Area (EEA). They may, hence, consider limiting the geographical scope of the cooperation to the EEA in order to avoid antitrust issues in other jurisdictions. 

• The ramp-up for a Europe-wide CO₂ infrastructure and CO₂ storage has so far been hampered due to a dilemma: transport and storage infrastructure can only be created if CO₂ is actually fed into the system, which in turn depends on the availability of the appropriate infrastructure and capture technologies.
• Cooperation to develop the infrastructure is permitted and desirable, but is strictly subject to the antitrust provisions of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and Sections 19 and 20 GWB as well as the specific provisions in the (new) national law, in particular, must not lead to abuse of a dominant position in connection with and access to carbon dioxide pipeline networks and storage facilities.
• The exchange of information between competitors within the framework of cooperation is only permitted to the extent necessary (need-to-know principle).

In June 2024, the foundation was laid for the development of a European carbon management infrastructure: by way of a regulation, the European Union set a binding target of achieving an annual CO₂ injection capacity of at least 50 million tons by 2030. In the same year, Germany also reopened the door to carbon sequestration as a net-zero technology. In November 2025, under new political leadership, Germany adopted the Carbon-Dioxide-Storage-and-Transport-Act (“KSpTG”). This act harmonizes the legal framework for CO₂ transport pipelines and introduces a range of instruments aimed at accelerating administrative permitting procedures. The changes in the field of carbon sequestration are, however, even more far reaching. The new law permits the industrial storage of CO₂ in the exclusive economic zone (maritime continental margin) and on the continental shelf. In addition, research storage facilities are allowed throughout the federal territory. Whether and to which extent carbon sequestration on German territory will be permitted, however, is now a matter for the individual federal states to decide.

In principle, this could mean that the build-out can finally begin. But in practice, the sector is facing a classic chicken-and-egg problem. In order to inject CO_2, transport infrastructure must first be in place. Building such infrastructure, in turn, presupposes the existence of emitters willing to capture CO₂ and feed it into the system, thereby providing the basis for a viable business case. Conversely, few companies will invest in capital-intensive capture technologies as long as it remains uncertain whether transport and storage infrastructure will be available in time. Expert discussions, such as the recent CCS event hosted by Luther’s Düsseldorf-based EPR team (see post here (in German)), demonstrate that solutions to this dilemma are most likely to be found through cooperation. This has also been recognized by the European legislator. When obliging oil and gas producers under the aforementioned regulation to contribute to the achievement of the Union’s injection capacity target, it expressly allowed for cooperation mechanisms to that end. At this point, competition law comes into play:

All cooperations must always meet the standards of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The establishment and operation of carbon dioxide pipelines and storage facilities are, in principle, in prior public interest (cf. Section 4 KSpTG). There will therefore be no doubt that such cooperations are generally permissible under antitrust law ‘as such’. However, the KSpTG does not provide ‘carte blanche’ under antitrust law. Companies must adhere to competition law when it comes to the specific manner of how a cooperation is established and operated. The following two aspects will be particularly relevant for companies (while in case of a cooperation in the form of a joint venture, the need for a merger control notification must also be examined):

• According to Article 102 TFEU, the abuse of a dominant market position is prohibited (under German law, even the abuse of “relative market power” is sufficient to imply additional obligations, Sections  19, 20 of the German Competition Act (“GWB”)). This means, among other things, that the operator of an essential facility must grant access to it under certain conditions and that there is a statutory obligation to do so in these particular cases. This is further specified in Chapter 5 KSpTG “Access by Third Parties.” According to Section 33(1) KSpTG, operators of carbon dioxide pipeline networks and storage facilities must grant other companies access without discrimination on technical and economic terms that are reasonable and transparent.  These terms may not be less favorable than those applied in comparable cases. Operators must cooperate to the extent necessary to ensure efficient access and provide necessary information. Section 33(2) KSpTG also regulates the conditions under which access may be refused. Finally, pursuant to Section 34 KSpTG, the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) may oblige network or storage operators to cease any conduct that contravenes the provisions of the KSpTG. Section 35(8) KSpTG then clarifies (declaratorily) that tasks and powers of antitrust authorities remain unaffected.
• Besides that, Article 101 TFEU also continues to apply. This also covers excessive exchange of competitively sensitive (strategic) data between (actual or potential) competitors. Companies may not use the opportunity of a cooperation that is permissible in itself to exchange strategic data “on the occasion” that is not necessary for the project and does not relate to it (“need-to-know” principle), e.g., that exceeds the necessary exchange of knowledge provided for in Section 40 KSpTG. The Federal Cartel Office took a similar view in context of the development of a CO₂ infrastructure in cooperation between several network operators, who had agreed on the construction and allocation of CO₂ pipeline sections and the joint dimensioning of the pipelines. We have already reported on this (see Luther Newsletter CCS September 2025 here (in German)).

Further information can be found here (in German). We also provide regular updates on current and future developments in the field of CCS in the Luther CCS Newsletter.

• Against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions and the steadily growing importance of key security-related industries, investment control has established itself as an integral part of transaction practice in 2025.
• In Germany, the number of investment reviews remains high, with a particular focus on technology and security-related industries.
• At EU level, a reform of the Screening Regulation is being pursued, which is expected to be accompanied by a significant expansion of the sectors and transaction types subject to mandatory notification as well as the scope of review ; an adjustment of national rules is also planned in Germany in the medium term.
• Companies should examine investment control issues at an early stage, as even small investments or projects in critical sectors may be subject to reporting requirements.

By 2025, investment control has firmly established itself as an integral part of transactional practice. Driven by increasing geopolitical tensions (Ukraine, the Middle East, most recently Venezuela), the ongoing fragmentation of global markets due to trade conflicts and unreliable supply chains, new geopolitical alliances, and the steadily growing importance of key technological and security-relevant industries, foreign investments in domestic companies are increasingly subject to state control. For both investors and target companies, conducting an investment screening assessment is therefore indispensable, alongside merger control and, where applicable, state aid support as well as the review of filing obligations under the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (“FSR”).

In Germany, this development is reflected in the consistently high number of investment review cases. According to the latest available data from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE) (cf. here (in German)), annual filings have ranged between roughly 260 and 300 over the past five years. In addition, an equivalent number of EU notification procedures are conducted under the EU Screening Regulation. The majority of the procedures (around 85%) concern the cross-sector investment screening, which applies to transactions involving non-EU acquirers/investors. As in previous years, the USA ranked first among the most frequently represented investor countries of origin, followed by the UK and China. In terms of the sectors affected, the focus is primarily on target companies active in the information and communication technology sector, followed by healthcare and biotechnology as well as the energy sector. However, German companies operating in the defense industry are also becoming increasingly attractive to foreign investors, as reflected in the steady slight increase in the number of sector-specific screening procedures.

The number of so-called Phase II procedures, in which the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy BMWE conducts a more in-depth review of problematic cases, remains low, and acquisition-restrictive measures are rarely imposed. Nevertheless, investment control is increasingly considered not only a reactive protective instrument but also a strategic governance tool to safeguard national and European interests.

A clear signal of the growing importance of this issue can also be seen in Germany’s neighboring country: At the beginning of the year, Switzerland introduced its own investment screening regime. This is remarkable, given that Switzerland has traditionally been considered particularly investment-friendly and has deliberately refrained from establishing a general screening mechanism until now. The introduction emphasizes the European and global trend towards protecting internal know-how and strategic assets from uncontrolled outflows abroad.

Although the competence and specific design of FDI procedures lies with the individual EU European Member States and should in principle remain there, investment control is increasingly seen as a joint European task and responsibility: At the EU level, a revision of the EU Screening Regulation, which only entered into force in 2020, is currently in progress. A first draft is expected to be published in summer 2026. The proposed reform discussions aim at significantly greater harmonization of the individual national investment screenings, expanded cooperation mechanisms and information obligations, as well as an expansion of the sectors and transaction types subject to mandatory notification. It can be expected that additional mandatory elements will be included in the investment screening procedure in the future, which will in turn have a direct impact on the revision of the German regulations.

Currently, parties to transactions face the recurring challenge of having to coordinate multiple filings across different countries, each with its own procedures and deadlines, making planning complicated. However, a centralized EU-level ‘one-stop shop’, comparable to antitrust law, is currently not under discussion, as the European Member States are unwilling to transfer further competences to the European Commission. Accordingly, investment control law remains primarily a national instrument, shaped by the security interests of the individual Member States. Nevertheless, the EU Screening Regulation will continue to function as a coordination and information-sharing mechanism between European Member States and the European Commission.

The German legislator is also planning an update of the FDI provisions currently set out in the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (“AWG”) and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance (“AWV”). In the medium term, the introduction of a so-called “Investitionsprüfungsgesetz” (Investment Screening Act) is envisaged. However, European developments are to be awaited first. At present, the focus is on creating more practical and predictable rules. In particular, discussions are centered on clarifying and specifying the relevant sectors to enhance predictability for investors and reduce issues of delineation. Significant uncertainty persists, particularly with regard to the interpretation of cross-sector screening rules. At the same time, the reform seeks to ensure that investment screening does not become overly burdensome or apply to transactions that do not raise any concerns.

Overall, the upcoming reform of the EU Screening Regulation is likely to set the tone for investment control. Companies and investors should consider investment control from the outset whenever their projects have a cross-border dimension and involve sectors that are critical for supply, security, or particularly innovative technologies.

Experience from advisory practice shows that investment control applies more frequently than many investors initially assume: Even companies that predominantly manufacture civilian goods may unexpectedly become subject to filing obligations once they become part of a critical technology or defense-related project. This applies not only to products already on the market, but also to projects in the development or testing phase that potentially feed into security-relevant supply chains or have a specific defense connection. In addition, the comparatively low shareholding thresholds contribute to the risk that the FDI relevance of investment projects may be overlooked. 

It is therefore crucial to involve investment control expertise at an early stage of planning in order to avoid delays, retroactive filing obligations or other regulatory consequences. Centrally coordinated management of merger control, investment screening and, where applicable, state aid and FSR proceedings will therefore remain a key success factor for transactions in 2026.

• In 2026, the European Commission will make greater strategic use of the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation and shape its application in practice through the FSR guidelines and the establishment of precedents.
• The combination of the high number of notifications, a limited number of published decisions accompanied by extensive reasoning, and the new FSR guidelines suggest that 2026 will be a key year for the application of the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation.
• Initial Phase II decisions show that the Commission is demanding comprehensive, creative commitments and reviewing the impact of third-country subsidies on competition after the merger has taken place.
• FSR examinations now also have a significant influence on public procurement.

In 2026, EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (“FSR”) enforcement is likely to move from “learning the tool” to “using the tool strategically”, with the European Commission increasingly selecting matters that can generate precedent and guide market behavior beyond the individual file. A decisive step in that direction is the European Commission’s issuance of the FSR Guidelines on 9 January 2026, which are meant to enhance predictability and transparency of FSR application and enforcement (see our previous blogpost here). In 2026, the European Commission’s enforcement techniques and expectations will continue to crystallize through the European Commission’s decisions and investigations.

The first two years of the FSR portray a high-volume, process-heavy system with limited published reasoning. Many Phase I outcomes are communicated by brief letters rather than detailed decisions leaving the market with fewer “hard” precedents than initially expected. At the same time, reported filing volumes are substantial and continue to rise, despite of the relatively high mandatory notification and clearance thresholds. The European Commission has a broad screening base from which to choose the files most suitable for precedent-setting Phase II decisions. This combination—high volumes, limited published reasoning, and new Guidelines—makes 2026 pivotal, because it is the year in which the European Commission can translate procedural activity into more visible substantive enforcement, particularly as the business community adapts to the “new normal” of FSR-driven data collection and deal/tender planning.

The clearest template for what precedent-making looks like under the FSR remains the European Commission’s first Phase II commitments decision in concentrations, e& / PPF Telecom (Case FS.100011). Public Commission materials emphasize suspected foreign subsidies including an unlimited state guarantee and other contributions that could improve financing conditions and distort competition in the internal market after closing. The accepted commitments show a willingness to clear transactions where distortive effects are credibly neutralised, even where the alleged subsidy type is among the most sensitive categories. The decision also illustrates that the European Commission’s analysis does not stop at whether a bidder could “overpay” in the acquisition process; it also focuses on how foreign support may shape competitive behavior post-transaction, for example through preferential financing conditions, expansion capacity, or investment choices that rivals could not match. For 2026, the practical implication is that remedies will likely remain a central clearance pathway, and that the European Commission will be comfortable using long-duration and compliance-heavy commitments (including monitoring mechanisms) when it believes the distortion risk is structural rather than short-lived. 

A further second Phase II concentration case, ADNOC / Covestro, reinforces that direction and suggests that 2026 may see more creative and policy-inflected remedies. The European Commission opened an in-depth investigation in July 2025 and later conditionally cleared the transaction in November 2025. Public reporting indicates that the European Commission again examined measures such as an unlimited guarantee and other state-backed advantages, but what stands out is the broader framing: concerns were tied not only to post-transaction market conduct but also to the acquisition process itself, including whether state backing enabled the buyer to bid on terms that could deter other bidders. The commitments reportedly extended beyond purely financial “ring-fencing,” including measures linked to governance and access to sustainability-related intellectual property. This points to a likely 2026 trend: remedies may increasingly be designed not only to remove an immediate advantage, but also to rebalance competitive conditions in ways that align with broader EU policy objectives, especially where strategic industries or technology are involved.

Public procurement is also likely to remain an especially active arena in 2026, because the FSR gives the European Commission a direct lever in high-value tenders with immediate market impact and strong political salience. The first in-depth procurement investigation, involving CRRC in a rolling stock tender, was opened in February 2024 and ended after the bidder withdrew from the procedure, illustrating how scrutiny can be outcome-determinative even without a final prohibition decision. That early experience matters for 2026 because it shows that procurement investigations can reshape tender dynamics rapidly, and that withdrawal itself becomes a “case outcome” with deterrent effects.

At the same time, 2026 enforcement is unlikely to be confined to notified deals and tenders. Ex officio enforcement and investigatory tactics are poised to have a greater deterrent effect, as illustrated by the European Commission’s in-depth investigation into Nuctech in the threat detection systems sector in December 2025, and reporting on inspections linked to major e-commerce platforms such as Temu. Even without a final decision, inspections and in-depth investigations communicate that the European Commission is willing to “source” cases through investigative action and not only through notifications. For 2026, this widens the enforcement perimeter, because companies that are not engaged in a notifiable deal or tender may still face regulatory risk if their market presence, financing profile, or sector relevance triggers European Commission’s interest. It also suggests that the European Commission may increasingly use ex officio action to test how the FSR operates in politically sensitive contexts – security-related technologies, critical infrastructure, and high-profile consumer markets – where the internal market distortion narrative resonates strongly. The Guidelines’ treatment of call-in powers is central to how 2026 may feel in practice, because it bridges the gap between a threshold-based regime and a discretion-based one. The European Commission explains that it may request prior notification for otherwise non-notifiable concentrations and procurement contributions where it suspects foreign subsidies in the preceding three years and sees relevance for the Union, including effects on European production, access to technology or intellectual property, or the availability of services. For 2026, companies need to be mindful that call-in risk is becoming an integrated part of deal and tender planning even below thresholds, especially for transactions involving state-backed acquirers, strategic assets, or sectors that the European Commission views as politically or economically sensitive.

For 2026, we advise companies to fully embed FSR compliance in their M&A and tender governance, especially as regards the oftentimes lengthy process of identifying the foreign financial contributions (FFCs) received, across groups, sponsors, and supply chains. Against that backdrop, the most realistic forecast for 2026 is selective but more confident enforcement, combining continued high filing volumes, a small but growing number of Phase II cases chosen to set precedent, and more visible ex officio investigations in strategically sensitive sectors.