In October 2021, the German subsidiary of a Swiss bank (later the applicant before the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court and the defendant before the arbitral tribunal, hereinafter the ‘Seller’) sold its Spanish wealth management business to a Spanish bank (later the respondent before the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court and the claimant before the arbitral tribunal, hereinafter the ‘Purchaser’). The SPA contained a non-competition clause for a period of two years following closing. The Seller’s group was thereby barred from operating a wealth management business in Spain.
The SPA contained several exceptions to the non-competition clause. In particular, it was permitted to hold securities conferring less than 10% of the voting rights in a listed company operating a wealth management business in Spain. Furthermore, a merger with an entity whose Spanish wealth management business accounted for less than 5% of the revenues of the combined revenues of the merged companies was permitted. In this respect, the SPA provided for an obligation to divest this wealth management business within six months of the merger (according to the arbitral tribunal’s interpretation, even where the revenues were below the aforementioned 5%-threshold).
In March 2023, the Seller’s ultimate parent company merged with another Swiss banking group, which also had a Spanish wealth management business (accounting for less than 1% of the merged companies’ consolidated revenues).
In response, the Purchaser commenced arbitration on the basis of the arbitration clause agreed in the SPA (DIS rules of procedure), alleging an infringement of the non-competition clause. In a partial award, the arbitral tribunal concluded that the non-competition clause had been breached as a result of the merger between the Seller and the other banking group.
Consequently, the Seller filed an application with the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court seeking the setting aside of the partial award, arguing in particular that the award was contrary to public policy (the ‘ordre public’ exception, Section 1059(2)(2)(b) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO)), since the arbitral tribunal had failed to recognise an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU by the non-competition clause.
In an order dated 6 March 2026, the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court held that the non-competition clause was too far-reaching and therefore void, because it infringed Article 101(1) TFEU as part of the ordre public. The partial award perpetuated this infringement. The Frankfurt Higher Regional Court subsequently remitted the matter back to the arbitral tribunal so that it could remedy the flaw in the arbitration proceedings.
The Frankfurt Higher Regional Court finds that the partial award contravened the ordre public because the arbitral tribunal had failed to recognize mandatory requirements under antitrust law when interpreting the non-competition clause, and that the non-competition clause is incompatible with Article 101(1) TFEU.
The Frankfurt Higher Regional Court classifies the non-competition clause as a competition-restricting ancillary agreement to the acquisition of the business. It is generally recognized that an agreement restricting competition (such as a non-competition clause) may, in exceptional cases, not fall under the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements if it is objectively necessary and proportionate for the implementation of a competitively neutral measure – such as the SPA in the present case. However, if non-competition clauses or other ancillary agreements go beyond the extent necessary for the transaction in terms of subject matter, geographical scope or duration, they are contrary to antitrust law and therefore void. To substantiate the analysis, the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court refers to the standards set in the EU Commission’s 2005 notice on ancillary restraints (cf. here).
Against this background, the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court considers the non-competition clause’s time period (two years) and the geographical scope (limited to Spain) to be in line with antitrust law. Referring to the concept of ‘economic unit’, the court also considers it acceptable that the non-competition clause applies to the Seller’s entire group of companies.
However, according to the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court, in other respects the non-competition clause goes beyond what is necessary (at least if it is interpreted as by the arbitral tribunal, which assumes that the obligation to divest applies irrespective of the aforementioned 5% revenue threshold). Referring to the EU Commission’s notice on ancillary restraints, the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court states that the Seller must retain the possibility to acquire or hold shares in a competing undertaking for investment purposes without assuming a management function or influence. However, the non-competition clause does not provide for such a restriction in the event of a merger, which is why it is excessive and therefore void. Additionally, the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court deems the restriction of financial investments to holdings of less than 10% of voting rights to be too far-reaching. In any event, in the case of financial investments in unlisted companies, a restriction to less than 10% is excessive and void, because a 10% stake does not automatically entail the possibility of blocking strategically important decisions in unlisted companies or of exercising decisive influence. In the case of listed companies, the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court considers this to be at least doubtful, but leaves the question open in its ruling.
The decision of the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court emphasises once again that antitrust law risks in the context of M&A deals extend beyond the question of whether the transaction triggers merger control filing requirements. Should a dispute arise, authorities and courts will examine each clause individually to determine whether they comply with antitrust law requirements.
Regarding non-competition clauses, this means that they should be reviewed at an early stage of a transaction to determine whether their scope is in fact justified by the purchaser’s legitimate commercial interests. They must be limited to what is strictly necessary in order not to infringe antitrust law. The EU Commission’s notice on ancillary restraints, to which the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court explicitly refers in the present case, provides important guidance on this matter. Whether a non-competition clause actually complies with antitrust law is not limited to the question of whether, for example, the duration or geographical scope of the clause are limited to a permissible extent. Rather, it must be carefully examined whether the substantive scope is in fact restricted to what is necessary. If, for example, the clause prohibits passive investments that do not confer the power to exert competitive influence, this may exceed the scope permitted under antitrust law. In cases of doubt, clarifying wording, precise exceptions or illustrative examples should be included in the SPA to prevent infringements of antitrust law. It is also advisable to align the wording of the non-competition clause closely with the guidelines set out in the EU Commission’s notice on ancillary restraints.
Furthermore, beyond non-competition clauses, antitrust law should be considered regarding all stipulations entered into in the context of an M&A-deal. Among other things, particular attention should be paid to pre-closing covenants (ordinary course of business clauses). Here, it is important to ensure that the purchaser cannot influence the target company’s ordinary course of business until closing, as otherwise there is a risk of a gun-jumping infringement (prohibition on implementing the transaction before the necessary antitrust clearances have been obtained).
Therefore, a comprehensive antitrust law assessment of the SPA is an integral part of compliant transaction management. This plays a crucial role in avoiding last-minute adjustments prior to signing or closing, the risk of enforcement actions by competition authorities, and subsequent disputes between the parties to the transaction.
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