Commercial Newsletter for the First Half of 2025

Dear Readers,

 

In mid-2025, the global economy continues to be shaped by geopolitical and economic challenges. The protectionist measures implemented by the U.S. administration under President Trump, particularly the ongoing tariffs, have had a negative impact on global trade. Companies worldwide are responding with price adjustments and strategic realignments. Meanwhile, consumer confidence is waning, and stock markets are fluctuating. At the same time, the ongoing war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza are taking a heavy toll on the affected regions and impacting the global economy through humanitarian challenges. Supply chains remain disrupted, energy prices are volatile, and inflation persists.

 

In these turbulent times, we aim to support you by providing practical information, analyses, and recommendations for action. For example, in the current issue of our newsletter, the authors examine Regulation (EU) 2024/3015, which bans products made with forced labor in the European single market. This is an important step toward sustainable supply chains and corporate responsibility. Additionally, we analyze recent Federal Court of Justice decisions, such as those regarding proper cancellation policies and their implications for companies and consumers. Lastly, you can look forward to exciting court decisions in the areas of restructuring and insolvency.

 

In 2025, we aim to continue helping you successfully navigate legal challenges in everyday business through our articles and analyses. In this context, we would also like to remind you about our regular webinars on current topics in commercial law. For more information, please refer to the Luther Events Calendar (Events | LUTHER Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH).

 

Dr. Steffen Gaber, LL.M. (Sydney)                                                               Leon Breiden

Head of Commercial                                                                           Legal Content Coordinator

Background

By partial and interlocutory judgment dated 17 September 2024 (case no. 5 U 7318/22 e), the Munich Higher Regional Court ruled on an important question in the Wirecard insolvency proceedings: the judgment clarified how to classify deceived shareholders’ claims for damages under capital markets law in the Wirecard case for the purposes of insolvency law. Case law has not yet clarified whether shareholders are to be classified as insolvency creditors under Section 38 of the German Insolvency Code, which would enable them to file their claims for registration in the insolvency administrator’s schedule of claims and receive a pro rata distribution at the end of the proceedings, or whether they are to be regarded as lower-ranking creditors within the meaning of Section 39 of the German Insolvency Code, in which case their claims would not be settled until settlement in full of all claims filed for registration in the insolvency administrator’s schedule of claims and approved (“absolute subordination”). With an average dividend in insolvency of only three to five per cent for insolvency creditors, it goes without saying that lower-ranking creditors usually receive absolutely no distribution on their claims.

Facts

In 2020, E & Y GmbH Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft refused to issue a positive audit opinion to Wirecard AG for its 2019 annual financial statements because the latter had failed to provide suitable evidence for (alleged) assets in the amount of EUR 1.9 billion, that is, roughly 25 per cent of the company’s then total assets. The public learned about the audit firm’s refusal to issue an audit opinion through an ad-hoc disclosure published on 18 June 2020, following which Wirecard AG suffered heavy share price losses on the stock exchange and, as a result, filed for insolvency on 25 June 2020.

In these insolvency proceedings, claims in the aggregate amount of EUR 15.4 bn have been filed to date for registration in the insolvency administrator’s schedule of claims. Of this sum, around EUR 8.5 bn is attributable to former shareholders of Wirecard AG. The claims filed by the shareholders have not been taken into account so far, as the insolvency administrator takes the view that shareholders are lower-ranking creditors who cannot file claims for registration in the insolvency administrator’s schedule of claims. As part of the presently discussed decision, the Munich Higher Regional Court had to decide on appeal whether the shareholders may file their claims for damages in order for them to be registered in the insolvency administrator’s schedule of claims and can thus hope to receive even a small distribution from the debtor’s estate.

The court of lower instance, the Munich I Regional Court, had held (case no. 29 O 7754/21) that shareholders were not eligible to file their claims. The Regional Court’s legal assessment was based on the consideration that the relevant claims were shareholder claims and that shareholders were generally subject to subordination under Section 39 of the German Insolvency Code.

The decision of the Munich Higher Regional Court

The Fifth Civil Senate of the Munich Higher Regional Court allowed the claims to be filed for registration in the insolvency administrator’s schedule of claims. The Senate expressed the opinion that the shareholders were insolvency creditors within the meaning of Section 38 of the German Insolvency Code despite their close relationship with the company, arguing that there was neither a separate legal basis on which to classify claims for damages under capital markets law for insolvency purposes nor a legal method that would allow an interpretation to the effect that shareholders were lower-ranking creditors according to Section 39 of the German Insolvency Code.

By way of an introduction, the Senate made reference to a decision of the German Federal Court of Justice from the year 2005 (EM.TV decision, Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 9 May 2005 - II ZR 287/02). In said decision, the Federal Court of Justice stated that a shareholder could, in principle, be like an external creditor in relation to its stock corporation under certain conditions, provided that the shareholder had a claim against the stock corporation under, for example, Sections 826, 31 of the German Civil Code or Section 823 (2) of the German Civil Code in conjunction with Section 400 of the German Stock Corporation Act. Referring to the decision of the Federal Court of Justice of 19 May 2022 (case no. IX ZR 67/21), the Senate then applied this assessment to similar cases in an insolvency setting, pointing out that the fact that the holders of the claims were shareholders did not necessarily mean there was a “comparable shareholder position” and, therefore, did not automatically lead to the subordination of the claim.

The Senate elaborated that the reason for the company’s potential liability was the tortious behaviour of its management board; that the tortious obligation arose already upon the management board’s actions that caused the damage; that being a shareholder was not, therefore, necessary for the damage to occur; that the extent of the damage was rather to be determined by means of a comparison between the financial situation prior to and after the event causing the damage; and that the damage might thus not be linked to the circumstance of being a shareholder.

The Senate further elaborated that the German Insolvency Code did not lead to a different assessment. The purpose of the German Insolvency Code was to accept and settle the existing claims under substantive law unless and except to the extent that there were any deviating provisions of law, which did not exist in the case at issue. In contrast to this, classifying the claims as “lower-ranking” within the meaning of Section 39 of the German Insolvency Code would inadmissibly affect the legal position of the shareholders, thus violating their rights under Article 14 (1) of the German Basic Law. The dilution of the other insolvency creditors’ dividend in insolvency resulting from this decision had to be accepted. The Senate stated verbatim in this respect: “No creditor is protected from competition by other creditors.”

Practical relevance

The Munich Higher Regional Court’s decision strengthens the rights of shareholders by allowing them to file their own (tort) claims for damages against the company as insolvency creditors. Consequently, shareholders can expect at least a small payment from the debtor’s estate in such cases. Whether it makes sense from a legal policy perspective to accept the resulting dilution of the other creditors’ insolvency claims remains doubtful in light of the fact that the average dividends in insolvency were already negligible prior to the presently discussed decision. Many creditors will have to ask themselves whether participating in the insolvency proceedings is still worthwhile.

It remains to be seen whether the German Federal Court of Justice will uphold the decision despite all legal policy concerns. The Munich Higher Regional Court has granted leave to file an appeal on points of law. There seem, however, to be stronger substantive law arguments in favour of the opinion adopted by the Munich Higher Regional Court.
 

 

This is the first in a series of three blog posts designed to help non-legal employees negotiate and close business transactions. Parts two and three will follow in the coming weeks. The information is intended in particular for employees who work in a purchasing or sales department and regularly struggle with suppliers or customers over the terms of their long-term or short-term collaboration. However, the same principles apply to the negotiations and formation of contracts with any other partners of your company, as well. The purpose of this first part of the series is to explain the strategic importance and legal leeway that may be involved in the submission of the first written contract offer, as well as providing some simple advice on how to deal with this situation.

1. Decisive factor: First contract offer

If two parties agree in principle on a business collaboration (regarding, for example, the supply of goods), both parties should strive to lay down their agreement in writing. To this end, one of the two parties will usually provide the other with a written draft. The wording of this draft contract will often be based on an internal company template or documents from previous transactions. This seemingly trivial circumstance has important legal implications!

The reason for this is simple: text templates that are pre-formulated for repeated use are subject to much stricter legal regulations than drafts created individually for a specific one-off transaction. Whether those templates are general terms and conditions of supply, of purchase, of business or text modules in internal company contract templates, on printed order forms, in model order confirmations, delivery notes or invoices: they are general terms and conditions (GT&Cs) from a legal perspective and, as such, are strictly regulated by law.

This also applies if part of the content of such a template is first tailored to the individual transaction – for example, by inserting the parties’ details, the subject matter of the contract, the price, the term and the contact persons – before sending the text to the other party. In this case, only the individually inserted commercial details will be exempt from control under the law governing general terms and conditions while all other provisions of the template that are not concerned by such individualization will continue to be subject to control. Provisions that are crafted by the author rather than being taken from a template, on the other hand, are exempt from the application of the law governing general terms and conditions from the outset; such individual provisions are not subject of this blog post.

1. Law governing GT&Cs: Unequal treatment of the parties 

The aim of the law governing general terms and conditions is to protect the party receiving such an offer (the “Recipient”) from the bargaining and drafting power of the party submitting a contract offer that was prepared on the basis of a template (the “User”). The actual balance of power between the parties in the individual case is not legally relevant. It also makes no difference whether or not the parties would have agreed many of the provisions that are contained in the used template, anyway. Furthermore, it does not matter whether the Recipient expressly agrees to all or some of the proposed provisions or whether the parties even reformulate some of the proposed provisions after negotiations.

Consequently, all provisions that are not individually renegotiated by the Recipient are subject to the law governing general terms and conditions. This may result in many seemingly harmless clauses being invalid, with the result that they are removed and replaced by the relevant provisions provided for by law. While these statutory provisions may be much more balanced, they sometimes also come as a surprise to both parties (to give an example: the template used by the customer provides for a payment term of 90 days, whereas the supplier might have accepted a payment term of 30 days, but the parties then learn that instead of the customer’s invalid standard provision of 90 days, the law requires immediate payment on/against delivery; cf. below 4.).

By contrast, the single clauses that are renegotiated individually between the parties (which usually entails a change to the text, without this being a mandatory requirement, however) cease to be subject to the protection offered in favour of the Recipient by the law governing general terms and conditions. Therefore, not only the question of which of the parties provides the draft contract (as a basis for negotiations) but also the question of whether certain terms proposed therein should be discussed by the Recipient at all is of great practical relevance if the proposed text is made up of model provisions.

1. Analysis: Different perspectives of the parties

The Recipient, if analysing its situation correctly, can take advantage of this: where proposed provisions may initially appear disadvantageous and unacceptable to the Recipient, this often indicates that they may be invalid precisely because they are so one-sided. Many Recipients instinctively misjudge this situation strategically. They get bogged down in long and dogged negotiations over provisions of the User that are actually invalid, which may ultimately cause a badly needed transaction to fail or – perhaps even worse – lead to the renegotiated clause being considered an individually agreed clause now due to the negotiations about it, thus allowing it to “become legally effective” in the first place after having initially been invalid.

While it may be worthwhile for the Recipient to accept or ignore invalid disadvantageous clauses and concentrate on renegotiating the valid proposals, the initial situation in which the User finds itself is different. Being in the actually advantageous position of being able to provide the initial contractual text, the User should not ruin this opportunity by drafting provisions that are too one-sided and, hence, invalid. In terms of negotiating tactics, the User will therefore often be well advised to try and propose the “absolute minimum/maximum of what is permitted by law”, rather than exceeding this limit and proposing blatantly one-sided provisions that would be invalid.

1. Exemplary checklist

But which provisions are typically invalid? As the invalidity of a clause ultimately always depends on its exact wording, it is difficult to make a general assessment; instead, each relevant clause must be examined based on its exact wording. Nevertheless, people engaging in negotiations can use the following exemplary checklist, which looks at some common clauses, to increase their awareness of the problem:

• Payment period (with the customer as the User): The customer can only validly propose a payment period of up to 30 days from the date of performance (even if negotiated individually, the maximum payment period that can be validly agreed for regular cases is 60 days). Any longer payment period will be invalid with the result that payment must be made immediately upon delivery. Therefore, there is no legal reason for the customer to propose (or the supplier to engage in negotiations over) a longer payment period.
• Contractual penalty (with the customer as the User): Many customers insist on agreeing to a contractual penalty for late delivery. From a legal perspective, this involves significant legal risks for the customer, as both the daily/weekly percentage rate and the maximum total amount possible must be appropriately limited. According to case law, a contractual penalty clause that provides for a contractual penalty in an aggregate amount greater than 5% of the contract value is invalid, at least in standard cases. If the customer’s model contract provides for a higher contractual penalty than this, there is no need for the supplier to enter into negotiations in this respect, as the relevant clause should be invalid.
• Warranty period (with the customer as the User): The customer may be interested in extending the statutory warranty period (which is generally 24 months for the supply of movable goods). According to case law, it is generally possible to validly extend the warranty period to 36 months, even in customer GT&Cs. It remains to be seen whether an even longer extension will also be considered to be valid. Consequently, the customer as the User will normally be on the safe side with 36 months; as for the supplier, there will be no harm in entering into negotiations over 36 months, given that an invalidity of the clause with the resulting application of the statutory warranty period cannot be relied upon here.
• Warranty period (with the supplier as the User): The supplier of a movable item to be newly manufactured may limit the statutory warranty period in its model contract to a minimum of 12 months from handover. Anything shorter than that will be critical, so the supplier will be well advised (from a purely legal point of view) to propose 12 months. The customer as the Recipient, on the other hand, will be well advised not to enter into negotiations to try and increase an even shorter (and therefore invalid) warranty period proposed by the supplier. This is because in the event of a warranty claim, the customer will be in the comfortable position of being able to rely on the statutory 24-month period. By contrast, if the supplier proposes 12 months or more, negotiations will not harm the customer’s legal position.
• Limitation of liability (with the supplier as the User): A supplier will often endeavour to limit its liability (to the value of the contract, for example). While the validity of an exact amount as an upper limit cannot be assessed across the board, it should be noted that a limitation of liability clause may be invalid as a whole solely because it does not expressly exclude from the limitation the claims for damages by the customer arising from injury to life, limb or health, or from gross negligence or intent on the part of the supplier or the supplier’s vicarious agents. This is because a supplier is always liable for the above-mentioned damages, without limitation. If the supplier’s wording does not include these exceptions, there is generally no need for the customer to enter into negotiations over the clause, as such a limitation of the supplier’s liability is likely to be invalid as a whole.

Conclusion: Recognising the decisive factors and making use thereof

The limits set out in the above checklist which, if exceeded, will lead to the invalidity of the relevant clauses are linked to the position of User and are not to be understood as general limits. More concretely, if the supplier proposes a warranty period of 6 months in the situation described above (for example, in the commercial terms and conditions of its offer), this warranty period will generally be invalid. If, on the other hand, the customer makes the first move in this respect and proposes a 6-month period (for example, in the commercial terms and conditions of its purchase order), this can be validly agreed.

As the above-mentioned provisions – and many other clauses not even dealt with here – frequently concern aspects that are of fundamental importance to both parties, anyone engaging in negotiations should be aware of the importance of the discussed basic decisions (regarding whether to submit a contract or let the other side take the lead; and whether or not to enter into negotiations over certain terms of a received contract offer). In many cases, an analysis of these decisive issues will be more helpful and efficient than lengthy negotiations. The task of people conducting commercial negotiations is not necessarily to carry out this analysis themselves, but to recognise the need for such an analysis in the first place.

 

According to estimates by the EU Commission, 27.6 million people are victims of forced labour. The extraction, harvest, production or manufacturing of products is particularly in focus here. Despite various legal and commercial efforts to eliminate forced labour, the problem persists. The European legislator has therefore gone one step further: The new  Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) (FLR), which is in force since December 13, 2024, will prohibit placing products on the market, make products available or export products that have been made with forced labour.

I. What is the purpose of the FLR?

The FLR complements European supply chain law and serves to effectively implement the International Labour Organization's Convention (No. 29) on forced labour. Although the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (EU) 2024/1760 and the Regulation on Deforestation-free products (EU) 2023/1115 are also intended to minimize human rights violations, they do not grant the member states comprehensive powers to "directly detain, seize or order the withdrawal" of any type of product after forced labour has been identified (recital 17 FLR). 

II. What and who is the subject of the regulation?

The FLR applies to all products, including their components. This means that all sectors are affected by the FLR. The origin of the products and whether they are domestic or imported is not relevant.

The FLR applies to all economic operators across all sectors, regardless of their size or legal form –  it therefore also applies to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 

III. What is prohibited?

Products made with forced labour will be banned in the EU; the FLR prohibits such products from being placed or made available on the EU market, furthermore such products shall not be exported. The FLR thus establishes a comprehensive marketing ban.

The decisive factor is whether forced labour was used in the manufacturing process of the products, i.e. "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily" (Art. 2 No. 1 FLR in conjunction with Art. 2 of ILO-Convention No. 29). Forced labour can be used at any stage of the product’s extraction, harvest, production or manufacture, including in the working or processing related to a product at any stage of its supply chain (Art. 2 No. 7 FLR).

IV. How do authorities investigate whether a product was made with forced labour? 

When assessing and investigating the likelihood of a violation, when initiating and conducting the preliminary phase of the investigations and when identifying the products and economic operators concerned, the authorities must follow a risk-based approach. This means that they must take into account, for example, the scale and severity of the suspected forced labour and the quantity of products involved. They must also use information on risk indicators (e.g. from ILO reports) and information available through the information channels to be implemented.

The administrative procedure itself takes place in three stages: 

• First, a preliminary investigation is initiated to determine whether there is a substantiated concern of a violation. Here, the authority gives the economic operators and, where relevant, other product suppliers the opportunity to provide information within 30 working days on measures they have taken in order to identify, prevent, mitigate, bring to an end or remediate risks of forced labour. The authority may also request this information from other relevant stakeholders. This means that a substantiated concern can also be based on other available facts.
• If the authority determines that there is a substantiated concern, an investigation on the products and economic operators concerned is initiated. The authority has extensive powers for such investigation. For example, all relevant information can be requested (again with a short deadline) from the economic operators concerned or (on a voluntary basis) from any other relevant person. Under certain circumstances, field inspections can also be conducted. However, the latter is subject to strict requirements in case the forced labour risk is located outside the EU.
• A decision on the actual existence of a violation is made on the basis of all the information gathered during the investigations. It should be noted that the authority can also decide based on other available information if, for example, the economic operator does not provide the requested information or otherwise impedes the investigation.

V. What happens if the authority determines a violation?

If the authority determines that a product made with forced labour has been placed or made available on the market, or has been exported, it shall, without delay, adopt a decision with the following content: 

• Prohibition on the placing or making available on the market, and on exporting the product;
• Order requiring the economic operators that have been subject to the investigation to withdraw products that have already been placed or made available on the EU market and have not yet reached the end users;
• Order requiring the economic operators that have been subject to the investigation to dispose of the products (or the concerned parts). However, in order to prevent disruptions to a supply chain of strategic or critical importance, the authority may instead order that the product concerned be withheld for a defined period of time at the expense of the economic operator. During this time, the economic operator has the possibility to eliminate the forced labour from the existing supply chain. In order to dispose of a product, it must be recycled or, if not possible, rendered inoperable; perishable products shall primarily be donated to charitable or public-interest purposes. 

The decision must contain the content specified in Art. 22 FLR and is either adopted by the EU Commission as an implementing act or, in case national authorities decide, recognized and enforced by the other member states.

If an economic operator does not comply with the decision within the time limit, the authority itself enforces the decision and moreover imposes penalties on the economic operator. As usual, the form, amount and enforcement of the penalties are the responsibility of the member states.

VI. Which authority is responsible? 

The competent authority depends on the country in which the suspected forced labour took place: 

• If the violation is suspected in an EU member state, the competent national authority of that member state acts as the lead competent authority.
• If the use of forced labour is suspected outside the EU, the EU Commission acts as the lead competent authority.

Products entering or leaving the EU market are also subject to controls and measures by the customs authorities. In future, they will have to be provided with additional information on certain product groups to better identify the products.

The FLR contains several provisions to promote the exchange of information and cooperation between the EU Commission and national market surveillance and customs authorities.

VII. When does the marketing ban on products made with forced labour apply?

The ban applies from December 14, 2027. 

However, the authorities must take action now, for example to set up information and communication systems.

VIII. What should companies do now?

In future, companies must ensure that they do not place or make available on the market, or export any products that have been made with forced labour. 

The following steps can already be recommended to prepare in good time:

• Early compliance with the due diligence obligations regulated in other legal acts (e.g. LkSG or EUDR)
• Implementation of risk analyses on potential forced labour risks in the supply chains;
• Establishing and implementing documentation of measures to identify, prevent, mitigate and end forced labour risks.

In this context, the guidelines provided for in the FLR, which still have to be issued, will be important. By June 14, 2026, the EU Commission shall provide, inter alia, guidelines for economic operators on due diligence in relation to forced labour and on best practices for bringing to an end and remediating forced labour, as well as information on risk indicators of forced labour. 

For SMEs in particular, it is important to keep an eye on the measures adopted by the EU Commission to support economic operators. It has already been established that contact points should be available for SMEs to provide information on matters relating to the FLR. 

We are happy to support you with your challenges in connection with supply chain due diligence and forced labour.

 

 

Hintergrund 

Die Insolvenzantragspflicht tritt bei haftungsbeschränkten, juristischen Personen nach § 15a Abs. 1 InsO ein, wenn diese zahlungsunfähig i.S.d. § 17 InsO oder überschuldet i.S.d. § 19 InsO sind. Dieser gesetzliche Mechanismus bewirkt, dass nach dem Antrag Sicherungsmaßnahmen nach §§ 21 ff. InsO implementiert werden (sollen), die die spätere Insolvenzmasse schützen. Wird kein Insolvenzantrag gestellt, soll das handelnde bzw. handlungsverpflichtete Organ den daraus resultierenden Masseverlust ersetzen, § 15b InsO. Der Grundsatz, dass z.B. der GmbH-Geschäftsführer nach Eintritt der Insolvenzantragspflicht keine Zahlungen mehr leisten darf, kollidiert grundsätzlich mit seinen Pflichten, Steuern pünktlich zu bezahlen. Die grob fahrlässige Nichtzahlung von Steuern ist nämlich ebenfalls haftungsbewehrt, § 69 AO.

Diese Pflichtenkollision soll § 15b Abs. 8 InsO auflösen, der in den Fällen, in denen das Vertretungsorgan pünktlich einen Insolvenzantrag stellt, die Nichtzahlung von Steuern in der Phase zwischen Eintritt der Insolvenzantragspflicht und Anordnung von Sicherungsmaßnahmen durch das Insolvenzgericht als pflichtgemäß bezeichnet. 

Die Lohnsteuer ist die Vorauszahlung auf die Einkommensteuer. Der Arbeitgeber behält sie vom Lohn des Arbeitnehmers ein und führt sie an das Finanzamt ab. Dazu ist er nach § 38 I EstG verpflichtet. Am Ende wird die Lohnsteuer auf die Einkommenssteuer verrechnet. 

Nun stellt sich die Frage, ob die vom Gesetzgeber formulierte Privilegierung der Nichtzahlung von Steuern in der Antragsphase das Vertretungsorgan des Steuerschuldners überhaupt absichert. Die vorhandenen Unklarheiten sind für die Vertretungsorgane nämlich empfindlich, da jede Verhaltensvariante hier zu persönlicher Haftung führen könnte. 

Alte Rechtslage

Nach alter Rechtslage (bis 2021) war die Haftung für masseschmälernde Zahlungen in einigen Spezialgesetzen geregelt; wobei der Wortlaut im Wesentlichen identisch war. 

Nachdem die Zahlungsunfähigkeit der Gesellschaft eingetreten ist oder sich ihre Überschuldung ergeben hat, darf der Vorstand/Geschäftsführer keine Zahlungen leisten. Dies gilt nicht von Zahlungen, die auch nach diesem Zeitpunkt mit der Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen und gewissenhaften Geschäftsleiters vereinbar sind. (§ 64 GmbHG a.F., § 92 AktG a.F.),

Dem Grunde nach waren alle Zahlungen verboten, die  Ausnahme war z.B. in § 64 S. 2 GmbHG a.F. geregelt. Diese Ausnahme wurde derart restriktiv ausgelegt, dass die erlaubten Zahlungen de facto eine Fortführung eines Geschäftsbetriebs unmöglich machten, obgleich es der Zweck der Ausnahme war, die Fortführung des Unternehmens auch im Antragszeitraum zu ermöglichen. Allerdings bestand nach alter Rechtslage ein einheitlicher Haftungsmaßstab. Die rechtzeitige Antragstellung war nicht entscheidend. 

Die Pflichtenkollision bestand auch nach alter Rechtslage: die organschaftlichen Vertreter sind verpflichtet, für die juristische Person die Steuern abzuführen und haften für die grob fahrlässige Unterlassung auch persönlich, §§ 34, 69 AO. Im Ergebnis wurde die Pflichtenkollision von der Rechtsprechung aufgelöst, die eine Zahlung von Steuern dann nicht als haftungsbegründend i.S.d. § 64 GmbHG a.F. ansah (z.B. BGH, Urteil vom 14. 5. 2007 - II ZR 48/06 (KG)). 

Der Steuerpflicht wurde hiermit der Vorrang vor dem insolvenzrechtlichen Zahlungsverbot eingeräumt – mit der praktischen Folge einer Bevorzugung des Fiskus als sonst ungesichertem Gläubiger.

Einführung § 15b InsO 

§ 15b InsO wurde durch das SanInsFoG in die InsO eingefügt, die Organhaftung in den Spezialgesetzen wurden gestrichen. Somit befindet sich jetzt in der InsO eine zentrale Haftungsnorm, was systematisch stimmig ist und auch viele sonstige Missverständnisse ausgeräumt hat.

Der Wortlaut des § 15b I InsO entspricht im Wesentlichen immer noch dem der § 64 GmbHG a.F., § 92 AktG a.F.. Allerdings wurden in den Absätzen 2-8 viele Detailregelungen getroffen, die Ergänzungen enthalten.

In § 15b VIII InsO heißt es (gekürzt):

Eine Verletzung steuerrechtlicher Zahlungspflichten liegt nicht vor, wenn zwischen dem Eintritt der Zahlungsunfähigkeit nach § 17 oder der Überschuldung nach § 19 und der Entscheidung des Insolvenzgerichts über den Insolvenzantrag Ansprüche aus dem Steuerschuldverhältnis nicht oder nicht rechtzeitig erfüllt werden, sofern die Antragspflichtigen ihren Verpflichtungen nach § 15a nachkommen. 

Die Pflichtenkollision wurde in Absatz 8 also neu geregelt. Offensichtlich hat der Gesetzgeber die oben skizzierte BGH Entscheidung und deren Sinn erkannt und wollte eine Kodifikation schaffen (Bericht des Ausschusses für Recht und Verbraucherschutz Drucksache 19/25353 Seite 11 f.).

Die Rechtsprechung, dass die Zahlung der Steuern trotz Zahlungsverbot privilegiert sei, dürfte also überholt sein. Nun besteht explizit ein Vorrang des insolvenzrechtlichen Zahlungsverbotes vor den steuerlichen Pflichten – die Privilegierung gilt freilich nur, wenn im Ergebnis rechtzeitig ein Insolvenzantrag gestellt worden ist. 

Erstes Problem:

Überraschend ist aber die Formulierung „Ansprüche aus dem Steuerschuldverhältnis“. Die Lohnsteuer führt der Arbeitgeber nicht auf eigene, steuerliche Verpflichtungen ab, sondern auf die Steuerpflicht des Arbeitnehmers. Die Finanzverwaltung erzwingt lediglich, dass dieser Teil nicht über den Arbeitnehmer bezahlt, sondern direkt vom Arbeitgeber abgeführt wird.  Das Steuerschuldverhältnis kommt mit dem Arbeitnehmer zustande, dieser ist steuerpflichtig. 

Daher entsteht bisweilen die Auffassung, dass die Privilegierung des § 15b Abs. 8 InsO die Geschäftsleitungsorgane nicht hinreichend schütze. Diese Auffassung steht aber in Widerspruch zur Absicht des Gesetzgebers, die Nichtzahlung von Steuern im Antragszeitraum zu privilegieren. Ferner entspricht die Formulierung der Privilegierung insoweit auch der Formulierung in § 69 AO, der auch von „Ansprüchen aus dem Steuerverhältnis“ spricht. Sollte sich die Finanzverwaltung also auf den Standpunkt stellen, dass diese Formulierung die Lohnsteuer nicht erfasst, fehlt es ihr bereits an einer Anspruchsgrundlage für die Haftung des Geschäftsleitungsorgans. Insofern ist recht evident, dass die Privilegierung des § 15b Abs. 8 InsO auch für die Lohnsteuer gilt.

Zweites Problem:

Ein weiteres Problem stellt sich aus der Privilegierungsbedingung, dass Insolvenzantragspflicht eingetreten sein muss. Dies kann nämlich – zum Beispiel bei der Beurteilung einer positiven Fortführungsprognose nach § 19 InsO, durchaus unklar sein. Da die Privilegierung auch dann entfällt, wenn die Insolvenzantragsfrist verstrichen ist, muss das Entfallen einer positiven Fortführungsprognose oder der Eintritt der Insolvenzantragspflicht recht exakt datiert werden, um Haftungsrisiken zu vermeiden. Das ist häufig schwierig.

Ein geschicktes Argument für die Finanzverwaltung könnte demnach sein, bei einer Inanspruchnahme eines Geschäftsleitungsorgans nach § 69 AO das Vorliegen von Insolvenzantragsgründen zu bestreiten, sodass der Anspruchsgegner gehalten ist, diese in überzeugender Tiefe darzulegen. Hieraus könnte die Finanzverwaltung wieder Anhaltspunkte dafür entnehmen, dass die Insolvenzantragspflicht ggf. schon etwas früher eingetreten sei – mit der gleichen, bedrohlichen Wirkung für das Geschäftsleitungsorgan.

Drittes Problem:

Ein drittes Problem entsteht dadurch, dass bisher einiges dafür spricht, eine Gleichwohlzahlung der fälligen Lohnsteuer als haftungsbegründend nach § 15b Abs. 1 InsO anzusehen. Immerhin enthält § 15b Abs. 8 InsO eine ausdrückliche Privilegierung der Nichtzahlung. Auf eine Pflichtenkollision kann sich das Geschäftsleitungsorgan dann also nicht mehr berufen. Ob eine solche Zahlung gleichwohl noch „sorgfaltsgemäß“ nach Abs. 1 oder wenigstens „ordnungsgemäß“ i.S.d. Abs. 2 wäre, darf bezweifelt werden. Wenn die Antragsfrist verstrichen ist und die Privilegierung nicht (mehr) greift, könnte eine Gleichwohlzahlung infolge der wiederauflebenden Pflichtenkollision wieder zulässig sein, also stellt sich das Problem lediglich „innerhalb“ der Antragsfrist. Allerdings ist die Gleichwohlzahlung dann jedenfalls keine Lösung dafür, Unsicherheiten zu beseitigen, wenn der Zeitpunkt des Eintritts von Insolvenzantragspflicht unklar ist. 

Konsequenzen für die Praxis

Es ist noch wichtiger geworden, den Zeitpunkt des Eintritts der Insolvenzantragspflicht exakt zu bestimmen. Immer wieder bieten sich auch einige Zäsuren in einer Unternehmenskrise als überzeugende „Abrisskante“ an. Hier ist – wie stets – eine genaue Befassung mit der Liquidität des Unternehmens und eine aussagekräftige und weitreichende Liquiditätsplanung unerlässlich, auch wenn dies, gerade in einer Krise, lästige Mehrarbeit bedeutet.

Ebenfalls sollte ein Geschäftsführer – spätestens in der Unternehmenskrise – seine Erwägungen zum Vorliegen von Insolvenzgründen sauber dokumentieren und diese Dokumente jedenfalls fünf Jahre (Verjährungszeitraum des Anspruchs nach § 15b InsO) aufbewahren. Die z.B. für eine positive Fortführungsprognose nach § 19 InsO wesentlichen Details sind in der gebotenen Exaktheit selten über fünf Jahre auswendig abrufbar.

Autor

Gunnar Müller-Henneberg

Luther Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft, Stuttgart

On 1 January 2025, the “Fourth German Bureaucratic Relief Act” entered into force, bringing with it, among other things, a significant change with regard to commercial leases: they can now be entered into in text form, according to Sections 578 (1), second sentence, 550, 126b German Civil Code. Does that sound convenient? Perhaps. But this is precisely where the risks lie.

What has changed?

In the past, commercial leases with a term longer than one year had to be in writing (Section 126 German Civil Code). This meant above all that there had to be a document signed by both parties either by hand or by means of a qualified electronic signature. If this formal requirement was not complied with, the commercial lease was deemed entered into for an indefinite period of time according to Section 550, first sentence, German Civil Code, making it possible to terminate the lease early in accordance with the notice periods stipulated in Section 580a (2) German Civil Code. This possibility was often made use of in practice to get out of unwanted commercial leases early.

According to the new rules, the so-called text form (Section 126b German Civil Code) is now sufficient. This means that contracts can be entered into by e-mail, messenger or similar means of communication. A signature is no longer required, provided that the sender can be clearly identified and the communication is stored on a permanent basis.

What are the advantages of the new rules?

• Contracts can be entered into more easily and with more flexibility, as the text form requirement represents a lower threshold.
• There will probably be fewer involuntary early terminations due to formal errors, as fewer errors will be made when using the text form.
• Commercial leases can now be modified more quickly and more efficiently.

What are the risks?

What may sound like a simplification can cause new problems in practice:

• Unclear contractual situation: The text form especially makes it difficult to distinguish between draft version and final contract. This is because before a contract is entered into, the parties usually exchange numerous draft versions by, for example, e-mail, which basically already fulfils the text form requirement. Signatures offered a decisive advantage in this respect in that they generally allowed to ascertain beyond doubt that the document to which they were affixed – rather than any of the prior draft versions – was intended to be the final contract.
• Reduced evidentiary value: A lease entered into in writing is presumed to be complete and correct; this cannot be achieved with the text form.
• More administrative effort: Determining the specific contents of a contract is much more difficult and prone to error when using the text form. In order to determine what the parties ultimately agreed, all communications exchanged need to be stored and looked through. The aim implied by a “Bureaucratic Relief Act” is thus reversed into its opposite.
• Difficulties when selling real property: When buying or selling real property, existing leases will have to be reviewed more thoroughly as a result of the new legal situation. Buyers will need to take greater precautions, as changes to leases can now be made less formally. Sellers will probably increasingly have to make representations and warranties in purchase agreements to ensure that there are no undiscovered ancillary agreements in text form and that all correspondence in relation to the lease has been disclosed. This is why it would seem to make sense to look ahead and include a clause in the lease saying that if the property is sold, the tenant must confirm that the data room is complete.

What does this mean for you?

Even though the text form is now sufficient according to law, you remain free to contractually agree a stricter form, such as the written or electronic form. This may reduce certain risks, but can also give rise to new ones. In the event of failure to comply with the agreed written form, for example, there might be a risk of the entire contract being invalid according to Section 125, second sentence, German Civil Code, instead of it being (“merely”) terminable. In any case, however, you should be absolutely clear in your communication about whether you are negotiating or entering into a binding agreement. Furthermore, you should carefully document all understandings reached to avoid any misunderstandings or even liability when selling real property.

Our recommendation: The new rules may give you more flexibility, but they can also create legal uncertainty. It may be worth having a legal advisor take a closer look to find the best possible solution for you.

Die Maßnahmen der Vereinigten Staaten (USA) zur Erhebung von Zöllen auf Warenimporte in die USA haben zu einer starken Verunsicherung der internationalen Wirtschaft geführt. Für die Europäische Union (EU) etwa sollen für Exporte in die USA Zölle in Höhe von 20 % gelten. Kurz danach setzte US-Präsident Trump für 90 Tage die flächendeckenden Zölle auf 10 % herab, um den Ländern Gelegenheit zur Verhandlung zu geben. Nahezu sicher ist nur eines: Es wird höhere Zölle geben.

Von entscheidender Bedeutung ist, dass alle betroffenen Unternehmen jetzt die Auswirkungen der US-Zölle auf aktuelle und künftige Handelsgeschäfte sorgfältig prüfen. Ziel dieser Prüfung ist es, Risiken zu identifizieren und geeignete Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, um sich vor unerwarteten Kosten und finanziellem Verlust zu schützen. Dieser Beitrag soll Unternehmen als Leitlinie dienen, um erforderliche Maßnahmen zu identifizieren.

Anwendungsbereich 

Jedes Unternehmen, das Waren aus den USA importiert oder dorthin exportiert, sollte in erster Linie rechtlich prüfen, ob es von den neuen Zöllen und Gegenzöllen überhaupt betroffen ist. Die USA erheben die Zölle insbesondere auf Produkte aus Schlüsselindustrien wie Technologie, Stahl, Aluminium, Automobil und Agrarwirtschaft. Hier hatten die USA bereits im Februar 2025 Zölle in Höhe von 25 % auf Einfuhren dieser Produkte angekündigt. Zudem berät die EU bereits über etwaige Gegenzölle, die als Reaktion auf neue US-Zölle eingeführt werden sollen. Daher sollten sich Unternehmen nicht nur mit den steigenden Zöllen für Exporte in die USA befassen, sondern auch mit steigenden Zöllen für Importe in die EU. Auf die Entscheidung der USA, ihre sogenannten „reziproken“ Zölle um 90 Tage aufzuschieben, hat die EU mit einer gleichlautenden Entscheidung reagiert. 

Wer trägt die US-Zölle in Lieferbeziehungen?

Primär sollten Unternehmen die Gültigkeit ihrer Verträge unter den neuen Bedingungen prüfen und klären, wie die aufgrund dieser Zölle entstehenden Mehrkosten zwischen den Parteien vertraglich aufzuteilen sind. Dies hängt vom anwendbaren Recht des Vertrags und den Vertragsbedingungen selbst ab.

Geltung von Incoterms®-Klauseln der ICC

In der Praxis wird in den meisten Verträgen ausdrücklich oder stillschweigend geregelt, welche Partei die Kosten für Transport und Zoll trägt, nicht selten durch die Aufnahme einer Incoterms®-Klausel. Die Incoterms®-Klauseln sind kein unmittelbar geltendes Recht, sondern von der Internationalen Handelskammer (ICC) veröffentlichte, vorformulierte Regelungen zur Auslegung bestimmter Handelsklauseln, sofern sie von den Vertragspartnern in den Vertrag einbezogen worden sind.

Mit Ausnahme der Incoterms®-Klauseln EXW und DDP ist grundsätzlich der Käufer für die Einfuhrfreimachung, d.h. den Import, und der Verkäufer für die Ausfuhrfreimachung, also den Export, verantwortlich. Sofern die Vertragsparteien die Incoterms®-Klausel „Delivered Duty Paid“ (DDP) vereinbart haben, trägt der Verkäufer alle Kosten für Einfuhr- und Ausfuhrzölle bis zum Lieferort. Dies ist in der Regel die Betriebsstätte des Käufers. Damit trägt der Verkäufer bei dieser Klausel ebenfalls das zollrechtliche Risiko im grenzüberschreitenden Verkehr. Spiegelbildlich zu der Incoterms®-Klausel DDP obliegt die Zollfreimachung bei Vereinbarung der Klausel „Ex Works“ (EXW) vollständig dem Käufer.

Keine vertragliche Regelung

Geht man einmal davon aus, dass keine vertragliche Vereinbarung hinsichtlich der Zölle existiert und das Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf (CISG) nicht anwendbar ist, ist durch Vertragsauslegung zu ermitteln, wer die zusätzlichen Zollgebühren zu tragen hat. Nach der Zweifelsfallregelung des § 448 Abs. 1 BGB trägt bei einem Kaufvertrag der Verkäufer die Kosten der Übergabe der Sache, während der Käufer die Abnahme- und Versandkosten an einen anderen Ort als den Erfüllungsort trägt. Bei grenzüberschreitenden Versendungskäufen gemäß § 447 Abs. 2 BGB muss der Käufer sämtliche Transportkosten tragen, die nach Übergabe an die Transportoperson entstehen. Die durch die Versendung entstandenen zusätzlichen Kosten wie Steuern und Zölle nach Verlassen des Erfüllungsortes sind damit üblicherweise vom Käufer zu tragen. 

Möglichkeiten der Preisanpassung

Nach einer internen Vertragsprüfung und Risikobewertung der bestehenden Lieferverträge mit Vertragspartnern sollten die Unternehmen in einem zweiten Schritt den Dialog mit ihren Vertragspartnern suchen, um über die Auswirkungen der neuen US-Zölle zu sprechen. Hierbei sind insbesondere die folgenden Gesichtspunkte wichtig: 

Gesetzliches Recht auf Preisanpassung

Zwischen zwei Vertragspartnern besteht ein gesetzliches Recht auf Preisanpassung in der Regel nur bei einem grobem Missverhältnis zwischen der vertraglich vereinbarten Leistung und dem Leistungsinteresse der anderen Partei.

Nach § 275 Abs. 2 BGB kann der Schuldner die Leistung verweigern, soweit diese einen Aufwand erfordert, der unter Beachtung des Inhalts des Schuldverhältnisses und der Gebote von Treu und Glauben in einem groben Missverhältnis zu dem Leistungsinteresse der anderen Partei steht. Bei unerwarteten Leistungserschwerungen, die zu einer bloßen Störung des Kosten-Nutzen-Verhältnisses zwischen Leistung und Gegenleistung führen, greift der Einwand der Unmöglichkeit nach § 275 Abs. 2 BGB jedoch nicht. Die Erhöhung von Zollgebühren stellt keine grobe Unverhältnismäßigkeit für die betroffene Partei dar. 

Sofern sich Umstände nach Vertragsschluss schwerwiegend geändert haben und die Parteien den Vertrag in Kenntnis dessen nicht oder mit anderem Inhalt geschlossen hätten und einer Partei das Festhalten am Vertrag nicht zugemutet werden kann, kann gemäß § 313 Abs. 1 BGB eine Vertragspartei eine Vertragsanpassung an die geänderten Umstände verlangen. Allerdings muss dafür eine schwerwiegende, wesentliche Änderung vorliegen. Zudem muss nach der Rechtsprechung durch die Änderung eine unter Umständen existenziell bedeutsame Folge für eine Partei eintreten, deren Vorliegen sich nach der Vertragsart und den Umständen des Einzelfalls bestimmt.

Darüber hinaus begründen vorhersehbare Änderungen grundsätzlich kein Recht auf Vertragsanpassung nach § 313 Abs. 1 BGB, da die zum normalen Vertragsrisiko gehörenden Störungen zu Lasten der betroffenen Partei gehen. Lieferverträge beinhalten stets ein gewisses Risiko hinsichtlich Preisschwankungen oder gestiegener Transportkosten, etwa wenn die Vertragsparteien Festpreise vereinbaren. Zudem dürfte zu berücksichtigen sein, dass die Implementierung höherer US-Zölle durch US-Präsident Trump in der Vergangenheit nicht selten thematisiert wurde und dadurch nicht gänzlich unvorhersehbar gewesen sein wird. Ob durch die gestiegenen Zölle eine schwerwiegende, wesentliche und vor allem unvorhersehbare Änderung der Umstände vorliegt, ist stark zu bezweifeln. Sollten die Voraussetzungen des § 313 Abs. 1 BGB dennoch vorliegen, ist die Rechtsfolge primär ein Anspruch auf eine inhaltliche Anpassung des Vertrages. Nur wenn eine Anpassung nicht möglich oder dem Vertragspartner nicht zumutbar ist, kann der Vertragspartner nach § 313 BGB vom Vertrag zurücktreten oder kündigen. Da bereits das Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen des § 313 Abs. 1 BGB zweifelhaft ist, ist das Vorliegen eines Rechts auf Rücktritt oder Kündigung des Vertrages aufgrund der gestiegenen Zölle sehr unwahrscheinlich.

Vertragliche Gestaltungsoptionen

Sofern die Vertragsparteien in bestehenden Verträgen keine angemessene Regelung bezüglich einer Zollerhöhung getroffen haben, sollten die Vertragsparteien bestehende Verträge anpassen und in künftigen Verträgen etwaige Änderungen von Zollgebühren bereits im Vorhinein berücksichtigen.

Lieferverträge enthalten typischerweise eine Regelung für Fälle höherer Gewalt (sogenannte „Force Majeure“). Höhere Gewalt wird definiert als ein von außen kommendes, keinen betrieblichen Zusammenhang aufweisendes und auch durch die äußerste, vernünftigerweise zu erwartende Sorgfalt nicht abwendbares Ereignis. Internationale Wirtschaftsakteure müssen damit rechnen, dass sich Zölle verändern, insbesondere unter Berücksichtigung der vergangenen politischen Jahre in den USA. Außerdem ist eine Vertragspartei durch gestiegene Zölle in der Regel nicht an ihrer Leistung gehindert, sofern die Zölle lediglich höhere Kosten für die betroffene Partei verursachen. 

Daneben ist die Vereinbarung sogenannter „Hardship“-Klauseln üblich, um Vertragsbedingungen bei veränderten Umständen, dem Vorliegen eines sogenannten Härtefalls, anpassen zu können. Um sich vor unerwünschten Auswirkungen von Zolländerungen in Lieferbeziehungen wirksam abzusichern, muss die Klausel allerdings hinreichend definiert sein. Daran scheitern die Hardship-Klauseln oft. Die Parteien müssen abwägen, ob sie das Vorliegen eines Härtefalls weit oder eng definieren, was in beiden Fällen zu Auslegungsschwierigkeiten führen kann. Starre Grenzen für einen Härtefall existieren nicht. Je nach Ausgestaltung und Auslegung der Hardship-Klausel stellen erhöhte Zölle einen Ausnahmefall dar oder fallen gar nicht erst darunter. Die Beurteilung erfolgt damit stets nach den Umständen des Einzelfalls.

In der Praxis gängig ist schließlich die Vereinbarung von Preisanpassungsklauseln, um in langfristigen Vertragsverhältnissen Flexibilität zu gewährleisten. Diese Klauseln ermöglichen eine nachträgliche Anpassung vereinbarter Preise bei sich ändernden Rahmenbedingungen. Die genaue Formulierung der Klausel ist entscheidend, da die Rechtsprechung strenge Anforderungen an die Wirksamkeit der Klausel stellt, insbesondere bei Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (AGB) nach § 307 BGB und nach den Regelungen des Preisklauselgesetzes (PreisklG). Eine wirksame Preisanpassungsklausel muss transparent sein und darf die Vertragsparteien nicht unangemessen benachteiligen, etwa durch einseitige Preissteigerungen bei Kostenerhöhungen ohne entsprechende Senkung des Preises im Falle von Kostensenkungen oder etwa dadurch, dass nur eine Partei die Anpassung verlangen kann. Es ist wichtig, dass eine Klausel zur flexiblen Anpassung des Preises an veränderte Zölle präzise formuliert und detailliert ausgearbeitet ist, um zu verhindern, dass die Klausel unwirksam wird. 

Fazit

Insgesamt ist es entscheidend, dass Unternehmen, die von den neuen US-Zöllen betroffen sind, jetzt proaktiv handeln und die erforderlichen Maßnahmen ergreifen, um ihre internationalen Geschäftsmodelle zu schützen. Durch eine umfassende rechtliche Analyse, Anpassung von Verträgen und enge Zusammenarbeit mit juristischen Experten können Unternehmen die Auswirkungen von Handelsbarrieren minimieren und langfristigen Geschäftserfolg sichern. Faire Regelungen zur Preisanpassung, Lieferzeitverlängerung und Haftungsbegrenzung können den Vertragsparteien helfen, flexibler auf die veränderten Handelsbedingungen zu reagieren und ihre langfristige Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu erhalten.

Autoren

Dr. Christoph von Burgsdorff, 
LL.M. (Essex)

Luther Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft, Hamburg

Luisa Kramer

Luther Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft, Hamburg

Background

In its decision of 25 February 2025 - VIII ZR 143/24, the Eighth Senate of the German Federal Court of Justice, which is responsible for car sales, ruled on the requirement to provide a telephone number in individually drafted instructions on withdrawal.

The car maker (defendant), who was advised by Dr Anika Wendelstein, a partner with Luther, as lead counsel in the large-volume series of lawsuits, sells motor vehicles to customers in Germany by direct distribution through its German distribution company. The individually drafted instructions on withdrawal that were used by the defendant in its dealings with its customers did not include a telephone number.

In the so-called EIS ruling of the First Senate, which is responsible for dealing with competition law cases, the Federal Court of Justice held that a trader is obliged under competition law to provide consumers with a telephone number prior to the formation of a contract if the trader uses the model instructions on withdrawal provided for by law (judgment of 24 September 2020 – I ZR 169/17). A large number of individual consumers seized on this judgment and claimed that they had the right to withdraw from their contract even after the expiry of the regular 14-day withdrawal period as no telephone number had been provided in the instructions on withdrawal.

Against this background, the defendant was facing a large number of withdrawals and corresponding lawsuits throughout the Federal Republic of Germany.

Facts of the case

The claimant, a consumer, purchased a car from the defendant via the online distribution platform. Upon formation of the contract, the defendant provided the claimant with individually drafted instructions on withdrawal which did not contain a telephone number. The car was handed over to the claimant in August 2022.

Some 10 months after the handover of the car, the claimant gave notice of his withdrawal from the sales contract by e-mail. The claimant argued that since no telephone number had been given, he was entitled to an extended right of withdrawal, even after the expiry of the regular 14-day withdrawal period.

The claimant sued for, among other things, repayment of the purchase price plus interest in return for the handover of the car and transfer of ownership thereof. The claimant was unsuccessful in the lower instances, most recently before the Berlin Higher Regional Court, which denied the claimant leave to file an appeal on points of law. In its decision, the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the claimant’s complaint against the denial of leave to appeal.

The decision of the Federal Court of Justice

Like the lower-instance court, the Federal Court of Justice fully adopted the defendant’s view and held that the defendant is not obliged to provide a telephone number in its individually drafted instructions on withdrawal if the defendant’s postal address and e-mail address are given. As a result, the claimant’s withdrawal occurred after the expiry of the withdrawal period and, therefore, is invalid.

The Federal Court of Justice interpreted the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU (“CRD”), which has been transposed into German law by Article 246a § 1 para. 2 sentence 1 no. 1 Introductory Act to the German Civil Code, and emphasised that the CRD does not provide for an obligation to give a telephone number. The Federal Court of Justice further held that there is no misleading of consumers if a telephone number which is available and can be easily found on the Internet is not expressly stated in the instructions on withdrawal.

No telephone number required according to the wording

The Federal Court of Justice started by establishing that the wording of the CRD does not give an answer to the question of what means of communication must be stated in individually drafted instructions on withdrawal in connection with distance contracts or whether a telephone number must be provided in addition to the postal address and the e-mail address. The Federal Court of Justice answered this question based on the context and the regulatory purpose of the CRD.

As regards the context of the CRD, the Federal Court of Justice found that the EU legislature did not provide for the provision of a telephone number in Article 6(1)(h) CRD. Said provision only requires the trader to provide information on the conditions, time limit and procedures for exercising the right of withdrawal. Other provisions, however, contain rules in respect of the telephone number (for example, Article 6(1)(c) and Article 5(1)(b) CRD). According to the Federal Court of Justice, an obligation to provide a telephone number also cannot be derived from the model instructions on withdrawal, where a telephone number is to be given. This is because, from a systematic perspective, the model instructions are only of secondary importance (Article 6(4) CRD) and therefore, in the opinion of the Federal Court of Justice, cannot be applied to the present case of individually drafted instructions on withdrawal. On the contrary, the Federal Court of Justice pointed out that the EU legislature, in the recitals of the CRD, even advised against making a phone call in view of the allocation of the burden to prove that the withdrawal occurred within the time limits fixed in the CRD.

In addition to context, the regulatory objectives of the CRD also speak against an obligation to provide a telephone number, in the opinion of the Federal Court of Justice. According to the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), the aim is to ensure that the consumer obtains not only information about the other contracting party but also the information needed to validly exercise his/her right of withdrawal (cf. ECJ, judgment of 10 July 2019 - C-649/17, NJW 2019, 3365, margin no. 41 - Amazon EU). This includes information about rapid contact and efficient communication by means of suitable means of communication, with the assessment of the means of communication being a matter for the national courts (ECJ, l.c.). The Federal Court of Justice emphasised that rapid contact and efficient communication with the defendant, which operates on the Internet, does not require the provision of a telephone number in addition to the postal address and the e-mail address. What is more, in the matter dealt with by the Federal Court of Justice, the telephone number had been given on the website, which, according to the Federal Court of Justice, has been expressly approved by the ECJ (ECJ, judgment of 10 July 2019 - C-649/17, NJW 2019, 3365 margin no. 52 - Amazon EU).

No misleading of consumers

The Federal Court of Justice also dealt with the question of whether the provision of – allegedly – incomplete information would actually prevent the withdrawal period from starting to run.

In the opinion of the Federal Court of Justice, this would require not only formally incomplete or incorrect information, but also that the consumer was misled by such information and was thus induced to enter into a contract which he/she might not have entered into had he/she been in possession of complete and correct information. Only if all of these requirements are fulfilled are instructions defective. This follows from the applicable principles established by the EJC in its ruling on the Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC) (ECJ, judgment of 21 December 2023 - C-38/21, C-47/21, C-232/21, juris margin no. 253, 264 - BMW Bank).

According to the Federal Court of Justice, the fact that the telephone number – which had already been communicated and could be easily found on the Internet – was not included in the instructions on withdrawal did not affect the consumer’s ability to exercise his right of withdrawal and, therefore, did not mislead the consumer. In particular, it did not affect the timely exercise – within the withdrawal period – of the right of withdrawal, as the defendant provided information about other ways to contact it, without excluding the option of a telephone call.

The Federal Court of Justice expressly refrained from applying to this case the EIS ruling, according to which a telephone number must be provided. The EIS ruling concerned the use of model instructions on withdrawal, rather than individually drafted instructions, and a violation of competition law (German Act against Unfair Competition).

Acte Clair

The Federal Court of Justices takes the view that the validity of the instructions on withdrawal issued without providing a telephone number and also the fact that there has been no misleading of consumers are so obvious in this case as to leave no room for reasonable doubt and, therefore, has refrained from requesting a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.

Conclusion

The Federal Court of Justice commented remarkably fast and in remarkable detail on the legal issues raised in the test case, thus providing legal certainty for the lower courts that have to deal with a large number of lawsuits, for the defendant, and also for the suing consumers.

The decision of the Federal Court of Justice is to be welcomed. While consumer protection is important, the requirements should not be exaggerated. In the cases brought against the defendant, the 14-day period had long expired when the claimants had the idea to withdraw from their sales contracts regarding the purchase of expensive new vehicles and, to this end, started to look for “formal errors”. According to the Federal Court of Justice, such an error can only have adverse consequences for the distance seller if the information it failed to provide was mandatory and the non-availability of this information actually misleads the consumer, resulting in the consumer being unable to properly (timely) exercise his/her right of withdrawal. Despite this fact, distance sellers should be careful. Even the slightest error in instructions can lead to a flood of lawsuits. And even if the distance seller ultimately wins those lawsuits, the reputational damage and the internal and external costs involved in the proceedings should not be underestimated.

The Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) was established in 1991 as an independent, non-profit organization and is a leading international arbitration institution providing neutral dispute resolution services to the global business community. SIAC has an experienced international panel of over 600 expert arbitrators from over 40 jurisdictions. SIAC has its own set of rules, the SIAC Arbitration Rules, which govern the arbitration proceedings.

On 9 December 2024, SIAC published the long-awaited update to its Arbitration Rules (the “2025 SIAC Rules”) which came into force on 1 January 2025. In addition to structural updates, the 2025 SIAC Rules introduce a number of changes aimed at modernising and streamlining the arbitral process, promoting cost-effectiveness and procedural efficiency, and maintaining arbitral integrity. The SIAC also announced revisions to its Schedule of Fees, which also took effect on 1 January 2025. The 2025 SIAC Rules were developed following extensive public consultation and thus in collaboration with SIAC’s users and stakeholders.

I. Streamlined Procedure for Low Value Disputes (Rule 13, Schedule 2)

Rule 13, Schedule 2 introduces the Streamlined Procedure for low value disputes (not exceeding SGD 1 million) of low complexity or where parties agree to its application at any time prior to the constitution of the tribunal. The Streamlined Procedure requires an award to be made within 3 months from the date of constitution of the tribunal. The tribunal´s fees and SIAC administrative fees in arbitrations under the Streamlined Procedure are capped at 50% of the maximum limits under the Schedule of Fees.

Complementing the introduction of the Streamlined Procedure, the threshold for parties to request for the Expedited Procedure (Rule 14, Schedule 3) has been raised to SGD 10 million.

II.         Preliminary Determination (Rule 46)

Whilst the previous SIAC Rules (the “2016 SIAC Rules”) did not expressly provide for Preliminary Determination, Rule 46 explicitly empowers the tribunal to make a final and binding determination of any issue in an arbitration at a preliminary stage if (i) both parties agree, (ii) the applicant is able to demonstrate that the determination would save time and costs or expedite the resolution of the dispute, or (iii) where the tribunal determines that the circumstances of the case warrant it.

Where the tribunal accepts an application for preliminary determination, it must render its decision, ruling, order or award within 90 days upon date of application, facilitating a swift resolution of specific issues.

III.        Enhancements to the Emergency Arbitrator procedure and introduction of protective preliminary order applications (Rule 12.1 and Schedule 1)

The 2025 SIAC Rules introduce enhancements to improve the ability of parties to obtain urgent interim and conservatory measures. Whereas the 2016 SIAC Rules provided for the appointment of an Emergency Arbitrator for urgent interim relief after the Notice of Arbitration was filed, applicants may now request the appointment of an Emergency Arbitrator prior to submitting a Notice of Arbitration, with the Notice to be required to be filed within 7 days. Parties now also can seek protective preliminary orders directing a party not to undermine the purpose of the emergency interim or conservatory measure requested, prior to notifying any counterparties of the application seeking the appointment of an Emergency Arbitrator. The Emergency Arbitrator must determine the request for a protective preliminary order within 24 hours of their appointment. An applicant must promptly transmit any such preliminary order to any counterparties within 12 hours of the order, failing which the protective preliminary order shall expire 3 days after the date on which it was issued.

IV.       Coordinated Proceedings (Rule 17)

The new Rule 17 introduces an explicit mechanism to specifically provide for the coordinated resolution of multiple arbitrations involving common legal or factual issues where the same tribunal has been appointed. The aim is to streamline the resolution of multiple complex arbitrations, reduce the risk of contradictory outcomes, and avoid duplication of costs across multiple proceedings.

Pursuant to Rule 17, a party may request that the multiple arbitrations be either conducted concurrently or sequentially, be heard together with aligned procedural steps, or that one of the arbitrations be suspended pending the determination of any of the other arbitrations.

V.        Administrative conference (Rule 11)

New Rule 11 empowers the Registrar to conduct administrative conferences with the parties, prior to the constitution of the tribunal, to discuss any procedural or administrative directions to be made by the Registrar under the Rules.

VI.       Active promotion of use of mediation (Rules 32.4 and 50.2)

Tribunals are not only trimmed to raise the prospect of adopting amicable resolution methods at the first case management conference (Rule 32.4) but are now also empowered to make any directions including a suspension of proceedings to allow parties to adopt such amicable dispute resolution methods at any stage of the arbitration process (Rule 50.2). Furthermore, parties are encouraged to explore such amicable dispute resolution methods at the inception of the arbitration (Rules 6.4 and 7.3).

VII.      Provisions in respect of third-party funding agreements (Rule 38)

Whereas the 2016 SIAC Rules did not require parties to disclose third-party funding agreements, the new Rule 38 requires parties to disclose the existence of such and the identity and contact details of the third-party funder in their Notices or Responses or as soon as practicable upon concluding a third-party funding agreement. Rule 38 further empowers tribunals to order such disclosures, and take into account any third-party funding agreement in apportioning costs. It further prescribes that, following the constitution of the tribunal, a party is not allowed to enter into a third-party funding agreement which may give rise to a conflict of interest with a member of the tribunal.

VIII. Applicability of the 2025 SIAC Rules

If a contract explicitly makes reference to the 2016 SIAC Rules, those rules remain binding for disputes arising under that contract. However, if a contract refers broadly to the “SIAC Rules,” without specifying the version, the latest rules in force at the time of the arbitration (i.e., the 2025 Rules) will apply. SIAC’s practice and arbitration law typically prioritize the application of the latest rules to promote procedural efficiency and align with modern practices.

The preservation of loss carry-forwards has been the subject matter of numerous legislative projects. In order to prevent well-earning (and thus taxable) companies from acquiring empty-shell limited liability companies with high loss carry-forwards for the purposes of carrying out a merger and using the loss carry-forwards to reduce their own tax burden, the German legislature enacted new rules as early as the Eighties. Under those rules, loss carry-forwards were only allowed to be used if “predominantly new business assets” were injected (former § 8 para. (4) German Corporate Income Tax Act). This led to an unclear legal situation and, as a consequence, to many judicial proceedings. In 2007, the German legislature decided to enact significantly stricter rules by introducing § 8c Corporate Income Tax Act, under which the acquisition of more than 25% of the shares led to a proportionate forfeiture of loss carry-forwards and the acquisition of more than 50% of the shares to the complete forfeiture of all loss carry-forwards. The details are even much more complicated.

In any case, the legislature introduced early on a so-called restructuring clause according to which there was no forfeiture of loss carry-forwards if the shares were acquired during a crisis and the acquisition was made for restructuring purposes. It was believed that without such a clause, a potential investor might wait until the company was insolvent in order to then purchase the business and benefit at least from write-downs or write-offs.

The current provisions of § 8c para. (1a) Corporate Income Tax Act have applied since 2019 and read as follows: “Paragraph (1) does not apply to an acquisition of shares carried out for the purposes of restructuring the legal entity’s business. ²Restructuring means a measure designed to prevent or put an end to insolvency or over-indebtedness whilst preserving the fundamental business structures.”

Modification:

A draft circular from the German Federal Ministry of Finance to the highest fiscal authorities of the German states now clarifies some (controversial) details of the provisions:

Requirements for restructuring

The application of the restructuring clause presupposes that, at the time of acquisition of the shares, the legal entity is in need of restructuring and capable of being restructured.

The legal entity is considered to be in need of restructuring if it is at risk of becoming illiquid – that is, unable to meet its payment obligations as and when they fall due –  and/or overindebted or has already become illiquid and/or overindebted (§ 17 to § 19 German Insolvency Code) = crisis.

The legal entity is capable of being restructured if resolving the crisis by means of the intended measures is feasible from an objective perspective.

Further requirements

The “preservation of the fundamental business structures” criterion is met if:

1. a works agreement containing job-related provisions has been entered into or
2. the wage bill is maintained in accordance with a certain formula or

3. significant business assets are injected.

   Works agreement

   An assumption to the effect that fundamental business structures are being preserved inevitably requires the conclusion of a works agreement in a business unit employing at least half of the employees. The works agreement must contain provisions regarding preserving and securing the jobs. A minimum number of jobs that need to be preserved has not been defined, however. The works agreement must be actually implemented.

   Wage bill rule

According to the law, “the relevant annual wage bills of the legal entity during the five-year period that follows the acquisition of the shares [must] together total 400 per cent or more of the initial wage bill”. This often led to confusion because it was unclear what reference value should be used. The Federal Ministry of Finance circular clarifies in this respect that the last five years prior to the acquisition of the shares are decisive for the determination of the initial wage bill. The circular further clarifies that this rule does not apply to legal entities with not more than ten employees.

Significant business assets

The Federal Ministry of Finance circular clarifies that the injection of business assets amounting to 25% within the 12-month period following the acquisition of the shares may be made either into the nominal capital or into the capital reserves. The latter is much easier to implement, from a corporate law perspective. Premiums are also to be classified as an injection. A waiver of financial claims may only be taken into account to the extent that the relevant claims were recoverable at the time the waiver was made.

If the aforesaid requirements are reversed after the acquisition of the shares, the preserved loss carry-forwards will be subsequently forfeited.

The circular of the Federal Ministry of Finance, if published in this form, will clarify some cases of doubt, thus making it easier to plan investments during a corporate crisis. Further improvements are conceivable – but that’s another story for another time.